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Both the defense and commercial industry sectors are increasingly moving to
automated manufacturing as a means to reduce costs and increase efficiency and quality.
The Navy can leverage both the capabilities as well as the benefits of this technology
application. For example, the acquisition of intelligent digital data in support of the new
weapon systems has the potential to render a percentage of the Navy/DLA parts inventory
as "virtual". This inventory would exist in "effect" but not in actual form until required.
The Navy has developed and demonstrated the capability to use intelligent digital data to
manufacture no-longer-available parts in a timely and cost-effective manner. The
application of this technology is a natural complement to the advanced technology in
computer-aided design and manufacturing incorporated in the Navy's newest weapon
systems under procurement, specifically, the New Attack Submarine. This thesis presents
an analysis of the application of this technology. There exists a market for this technology
application as demonstrated by the intelligent digital data candidate parts analysis
conducted during this investigation. As a result of this analysis it was determined that the
Navy can conservatively save $503 million over the life cycle of the New Attack
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The acquisition of data in digital format offers numerous benefits to
the department, most of which translate directly into cost savings.
(Longuemare, 1996)
Can the Navy apply intelligent digital data currently in use in the design and
manufacture of its weapon systems to the reduction of the spare and repair parts
inventory? More specifically, does the capability exist to do so? Is there a need to do so?
Is the Navy interested in doing so? What are the costs involved in doing so? These are
the questions this thesis investigates. The commercial sector is increasingly moving to
automated manufacturing as a means to reduce costs and increase efficiency and quality.
"Modern industrial production is increasingly characterized by manufacturing technologies
that incorporate computer based automation and information systems." (McGraw-Hill,
1995) In the 1980s, United States manufacturers spent over $400 billion on automation
equipment, technologies, and facilities (St. Charles, 1989). The relationship between
technology and economics is characterized by the following statement:
The speed and extent of recent advances reflect the timely
interaction of computer technologies with economic realities.
Giving customers a quality product with the features they want as
soon as possible and at a competitive price is the engine driving
many successful manufacturing endeavors. (McGraw-Hill, 1995)
The Department ofDefense is one of those customers.
The Department ofDefense has recently embraced the digital environment. The
Department ofDefense initiatives include the goal of"moving to a paper-free contracting
process by January 1, 2000" (Hamre, 1997), and the "migration of acquisition and
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logistics operations to digital methodologies and products by 2002." (Phillips, 1997) The
Department of Defense's progression towards a digital environment is demonstrated by
the series of initiatives contained in the memorandums included in Appendix A.
The Navy has demonstrated not only the ability to employ the concepts of
computer-aided design (CAD), computer-aided manufacturing (CAM), and flexible
manufacturing in the production and support of its weapon systems, but also the ability to
capitalize on technology available or under development in the commercial sector to
develop new weapon systems and maintain older weapon systems. For example, the New
Attack Submarine Program is being developed with a state-of-the-art CAD/CAM
application (Kowenhaven and Harris, 1997). Another example is the Navy's Rapid
Acquisition ofManufactured Parts (RAMP) Program. RAMP has proven successful in
the application of digital technology to the timely and cost-effective production of no-
longer-manufactured parts which were historically known to have long lead times.
The Navy has embraced digital technology in other areas as well. The "paperless
Navy" initiatives in message traffic distribution and publication maintenance are further
examples. More complex examples include the computer networks established between
Navy program offices and prime contractors to speed the flow of information and
hopefully speed the development and production in the program. The Navy, however, has
been slow to embrace digital data and use technology such as that found in RAMP as a
means of assuring future affordable and responsive support to these same weapons
systems.
Where in the vast Navy spare and repair parts inventory might such an application
of technology be most beneficial? One such application may be the United States
Submarine Force. The makeup of the Submarine Force has changed drastically over the
past decade. The Submarine Force ofFY-97 is composed of 73 Attack Submarines and
18 Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines (Dalton, 1996). This total of 91 submarines is down
from the Cold War high of 139 submarines in FY-87 (Chief ofNaval Operations, 1994).
The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review recommended the further reduction in the
attack submarine force to 50 submarines (Cohen, 1997). The last four major submarine
classes have been relatively large sized: the LOS ANGELES Class (62 submarines); the
TRIDENT Class (18 submarines), the STURGEON Class (37 submarines); and the BEN
FRANKLIN Class (41 submarines). However, the follow-on classes of submarines will
be smaller: SEAWOLF Class (3 submarines) and New Attack Submarine (NSSN) 1 Class
(30 submarines). Additionally, Congress has mandated that the first four New Attack
Submarines be prototypes, in order to develop competition and innovation (Polmar,
1996).
The spare parts inventory of the current Submarine Force has traditionally been
designed to support the large ship classes of the Cold War Era. The shrinking size of ship
classes and the need to squeeze more return out of every budget dollar calls for evaluating
whether the application of technology can increase the efficiency of the current spare parts
1 The New Attack Submarine (NSSN) was originally called the Centurion in its early
phases of concept development. The name was later changed to New Attack Submarine (NAS)
when Congress directed development of the program following the cost overruns of the
SEAWOLF Program. The acronym NAS was later changed to NSSN (New SSN) to avoid
confusion with other "NAS" acronyms.
inventory management system. The uniqueness of submarine operations and the spatial
constraints that the submarine environments impose have by their very nature stripped the
management of onboard spares to those that are absolutely necessary. In the management
of wholesale sparing, that part of the spare and repair parts inventory not carried on board
but maintained at depots, for the submarine force lies the potential for innovation and
savings.
This thesis investigates the costs of integrating the use of intelligent digital data
into Navy Inventory management. It will attempt to identify the potential costs of this
integration, including the cost of obtaining and maintaining the design data from the
contractor for each part. In the absence of specific examples of costs, a net present value
estimation model will be employed to estimate the value to the Navy of intelligent digital
for parts with a variety of part-specific characteristic combinations.
The process as well as the cost of obtaining the necessary intelligent digital data
for Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CDVI) will be analyzed. In addition, analysis will
be conducted to determine how much of the New Attack Submarine repair parts inventory
is within CIM/RAMP capabilities.
Finally, the net present value estimates and the CDVI/RAMP manufacturable
analysis will be combined to obtain a conservative estimate of the potential cost savings
for the application of intelligent digital data to the New Attack Submarine.
The scope of this analysis will be limited to the New Attack Submarine. The New
Attack Submarine was chosen because it is, according to the Department of Defense's
acquisition community, "the most sophisticated product" ever procured by the Department
of Defense. It is the first weapon system designed solely on computer. (Acquisition
Reform Office, 1 996) The New Attack Submarine is also a system very early in its
development and could benefit from this analysis.
(This page intentionally left blank.)
II. BACKGROUND
This chapter provides the background of the elements which are the focus of this
thesis: manufacturing in the intelligent digital data environment and technology in ship
design and manufacture. The importance of standards in a technologically advanced
environment is discussed first. Next, the levels of design data are described to provide the
reader with a context to understand potential uses for the intelligent digital data.
Finally, the last section describes the New Attack Submarine (NSSN) Program-the Navy's
most technologically advanced shipbuilding project to date-and the Rapid Acquisition of
Manufactured Parts (RAMP) Program—a technologically advanced program designed to
improve weapon system support while reducing support costs.
A. DIGITAL DATA APPLICATION
The storage and manipulation of data on a computer system is referred to as digital
data processing. The differences in the terms "digital data" and "intelligent digital data"
are manifest in the capabilities contained within the data. "Digital data" refers to
information that delineates information about some concept or describes an object. The
term "intelligent digital data" refers to information that not only describes the object, but
also describes the manufacturing process for that object. The discussion in this section
focuses on "intelligent digital data".
1. Industry Trends
The technical intensity ofmany manufacturing and service industries has
increased dramatically at the same time that a revolution in production
systems, both the human and technical elements, has redefined the standard
of competitive organizational and managerial performance for most
companies. (National Academy of Engineering, 1993)
The overall trend in industry today is toward technical intensity. Just-in-time
manufacturing, lean manufacturing, agile manufacturing, flexible manufacturing systems,
computer integrated manufacturing (CTM), computer-aided design (CAD), computer-
aided manufacturing (CAM), and computer-aided engineering (CAE) are just some of the
terms associated with this industrial technical intensity. The benefits that industry hopes to
achieve with technical intensity are decreased costs, increased efficiency, and improved
quality (McGraw-Hill, 1995).
2. Data Exchange
It is not enough in this complex, fast-paced, economic environment to be able to
effectively employ computer systems internally in an organization. A key to
competitiveness is the ability to exchange data electronically in the business environment.
(ECIC, 1995)
The exchange of business data in the computer environment is referred to as
Electronic Commerce (EC). Electronic Commerce is the paperless exchange of business
information using Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), electronic mail (E-mail), computer
bulletin boards, fax, electronic funds transfer (EFT), and other similar technologies
(ECIC, 1995).
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The specific application within EC ofEDI is a focal point of this thesis. Electronic
Data Interchange (EDI) is the computer-to-computer exchange of business information
using a public standard. Public standards are the agreed upon data format for the
exchange. Standards are absolutely vital for the exchange of digital information.
Standardized digital information is just as understandable, interpretable and useful to the
person or machine receiving it as it was to the person or machine from which it originated.
(CALS, 1997) EDI is a central part ofEC because it enables businesses to exchange
business information electronically much faster and more cost efficiently and accurately
than would be possible using paper-based systems (ECIC, 1995).
3. Initiatives and Applications
The military has long understood the usefulness of digital data. From the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency's (DARPA) development of the Internet to the
development of wireless high-speed communications to the creation of devices and
systems to store voluminous amounts of data and information in confined spaces, the
United States military has benefited tremendously from applications of digital technology.
The Department ofDefense has established a series of ongoing initiatives to ensure that
the department continues to actively apply all of the benefits that digital data have to offer
in a coordinated manner. These initiatives include Continuous Acquisition and Lifecycle
Support (CALS), Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange (EC/EDI), and
Logistic Business Systems (LBS). In July 1997 the offices undertaking these three
initiatives were consolidated into the Life-Cycle Information Integration Office. The
consolidation of these initiatives was seen as necessary because "The increasing
complexities and interdependencies of acquisition and logistics systems integration
requires a dedicated synergistic effort to address issues of information integration, and
shared data throughout the weapon system life cycle." (Phillips, 1997)
CALS is a Department ofDefense strategy to accelerate the transition from
paper-intensive non-integrated product development, design, manufacturing, and support
processes to a highly automated, integrated mode of operation by developing (1)
standards for data storage and exchange and (2) automated systems to store, manage, and
distribute this information to many and varied users across an enterprise. The CALS
initiative and its subsequent spinoffs have emphasized the need for standards for the
exchange of product data.
The need for product data standardization is further emphasized by the many and
varied purposes to which product data are applied during the life cycle of a weapon
system. These purposes include manufacture, design update, supply support,
maintenance, and disposal. These purposes may involve different computer systems in
different organizations and in different geographic locations. Additionally, over time,
computer system hardware and software will continue to advance. Clearly, in order to
sustain such a support environment organizations need to be able to represent their
product information in a common, computer-interpretable form that is required to remain
complete and consistent when exchanged among different and evolving computer systems.
To this end, various organizations concerned with the use of digital data have pushed for
standards to be established on an international level in this area. This emphasis has
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resulted in the development and approval of an international standard for the exchange of
digital data. The standard is called the Standard for the Exchange of Product Model Data
(STEP).
a. Standardfor the Exchange ofProduct Model Data (STEP)
The Standard for the Exchange of Product Model Data (STEP) is an
international standard for the computer-interpretable representation and exchange of
product data. The objective is to provide a neutral mechanism capable of describing
product data throughout the life cycle of a product, independent of any particular system.
The nature of this description makes it suitable not only for neutral file exchange, but also
as a basis for implementing and sharing product databases and archiving. (SCRA, 1997)
STEP offers manufacturers, designers, contractors and others the ability to more easily
share three-dimensional product information among CAD/CAM/CAE systems.
(IBM/Dassault, 1997).
STEP gained international approval in December 1994 by the International
Standards Organization (ISO) and was designated ISO Standard 10303. The standard has
already been embraced by the private sector, as evidenced by General Motors employment
of STEP in its production processes beginning in May 1996. (CALS, 1996)
The development and subsequent approval by the ISO is the result of the
efforts of a consortium of industry and government organizations working toward a
common goal. This consortium is known as Product Data Exchange Using STEP
(PDES).
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b. Product Data Exchange Using STEP (PDES)
Product Data Exchange Using STEP (PDES) is composed of 25 major
industrial companies and government agencies who represent more than $600 billion in
annual revenue (CALS, 1996). PDES acts to ensure that the requirements of United
States industry are incorporated into STEP. PDES is a voluntary activity coordinated by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). (SCRA, 1997)
B. DESIGN AND MANUFACTURE
In discussing design data and its propensity for use in digital form, the definition of
design data and the various levels must be clearly understood. Design data not only take
on several formats but also, within the context of the Department ofDefense, three
specific levels of detail. The military specifications for the different levels of detail in
engineering drawings and associated data are found in DOD-D-1000B dated 28 October
1977, with Amendment 3, dated 13 May 1983. The levels are structured to provide a
natural progression from concept inception to production. There are three levels of
engineering drawings. The definitions of each level follow:
1.. Level I - Conceptual and Developmental Design
Engineering drawings and associated lists prepared to this Level shall, as a
minimum, disclose engineering design information sufficient to evaluate an
engineering concept and may provide information sufficient to fabricate
developmental hardware. Engineering drawings and associated lists
prepared to this Level shall be legible and include those types most
amenable to the mode of presentation. Layout drawings and combinations
of types of engineering drawings may be used to convey the engineering
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concept in such a manner the engineering information is understandable to
cognizant Government engineers and scientists or enable fabrication by the
design contractor of developmental hardware for test or experimentation.
(DOD-D-1000B, 1977)
2. Level II - Production Prototype and Limited Production
Engineering drawings and associated lists prepared to this Level shall, as a
minimum, disclose a design approach suitable to support the manufacture
of a production prototype and limited production models. Engineering
drawing types shall include, as applicable, parts list, detail and assembly
drawings, interface control data, diagrams, performance characteristics,
critical manufacturing limits, and details of new materials and processes.
Special inspection and test requirements necessary to determine compliance
with requirements for the item shall be defined on the engineering drawings
or referenced to a document acceptable to the Government.
(DOD-D-1000B, 1977)
3. Level HI - Production
Engineering drawings and associated lists prepared to this level shall
provide engineering definition sufficiently complete to enable a competent
manufacturer to produce and maintain quality control of item(s) to the
degree that physical and performance characteristics interchangeable with
those of the original design are obtained without resorting to additional
product design effort, additional design data, or recourse to the original
design activity. These engineering drawings shall: (a) reflect the end
product, (b) provide the engineering data for the support of quantity
production, and (c) in conjunction with other related preprocurement data
shall provide the necessary data to permit competitive procurement of
items substantially identical to the original item(s). Engineering drawings
shall include details of unique processes, i.e., not published or generally
available to industry, when essential to design and manufacture;
performance ratings; dimensional and tolerance data; critical manufacturing
assembly sequences; input and output characteristics; diagrams; mechanical
and electrical connections; physical characteristics including form and
finish; details of material identification; inspection, test and evaluation
criteria; necessary calibration information; and quality control data.
(DOD-D-1000B, 1977)
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It is clear from the above definitions that the term "design data" can be an
ambiguous term. For the purposes of this thesis the term "design data" will be used to
mean level III design data. Any use of the term "design data" for other than level III shall
be qualified to specify either level I or level II.
Design or equipment data for ships and other weapons systems have traditionally
been supplied to the Navy in hardcopy form as well as stored on microfiche or microfilm.
The computer age has provided the capability of storing this data on a variety of computer
storage media for the purposes of retrieval, update, correction, viewing, and reproduction.
These capabilities then provide for many applications related to weapon system support.
C. NAVY APPLICATIONS OF THE TECHNOLOGY
1. The New Attack Submarine (NSSN) Program
The New Attack Submarine was developed as a less costly alternative to the
SEAWOLF Submarine. The New Attack Submarine Program began at a time when the
SEAWOLF Program was battling for its life. The SEAWOLF Submarine was designed
to combat the Cold War threat as the follow-on to the LOS ANGELES Class fast attack
submarine. The SEAWOLF Submarine, a new and much improved design from that of
the LOS ANGELES Class, was to be the answer to the Soviet Submarine Fleet's progress
in narrowing the gap between it and the United States Submarine Force's acoustic
advantage. The SEAWOLF' s significant design changes to improve tactical performance
and sensor and weapon capabilities came with an expensive price tag. It was a price that
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Congress was not willing to pay, especially after the breakup of the former Soviet Union.
The SEAWOLF Program started as a 29-ship class. After the 1990 Department of
Defense Major Warship and Threat Review, SEAWOLF production was cut from 29 to
12 ships. There was an attempt to cancel the program in 1992 after completing only the
lead ship. The attempt resulted in the program being cut back to two ships, with a third
hull later authorized in FY-96. One of the reasons the SEAWOLF Class was reestablished
after the attempted cancellation was to sustain the nuclear shipbuilding industrial base
between completion ofthe last LOS ANGELES Class submarine and the lead ship of the
New Attack Submarine Class. As the class was pared down in size, the economies of
scale began to evaporate and the price per platform increased substantially. The cost of
the SEAWOLF Program was capped by Congress in 1994 at $4.76 billion for two units.
(Philpott, 1997; GAO/NSIAD-94-201BR, 1994)
The New Attack Submarine was developed to "fill out" the force level of 50
submarines beyond the year 2000, which was the anticipated need under the planning
guidance of the early 1990s. The New Attack Submarine Program is planned for 30
platforms (GAO/NSIAD-97-25, 1996). The design team at Electric Boat has stated, "The
objective of the NSSN Program is to produce a multi-mission, easy-to-upgrade submarine
with the acoustic performance of the SEAWOLF (SSN-21), an acquisition cost equal to
or lower than the cost of an additional LOS ANGELES (SSN-688)-Class submarine, and
low life cycle cost." (Kowenhaven and Harris, 1997)
In February 1991, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) and Chief ofNaval
Operations (CNO) directed the start of exploration of a New Attack Submarine Class.
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The need for the New Attack Submarine was established in the Mission Need Statement
(MNS) dated 10 October 1991. The Mission Needs Statement was validated by the Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) on 23 October 1991.
The New Attack Submarine is designed to be an affordable yet capable platform
taking advantage of technological advancements. The New Attack Submarine will, as a
minimum, maintain SEAWOLF radiated noise, target strength and non-acoustic stealth
characteristics. The New Attack Submarine will be required to maintain covert presence
and to be sustained 24 hours per day, with an emphasis on joint forces multi-mission
capability. The New Attack Submarine mission areas include: Covert Strike Warfare
(Strike), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Covert Intelligence Collection/Surveillance,
Covert Indication and Warning (I&W)/Electronic Warfare (EW), Anti-Surface Ship
Warfare (ASUW), Covert Mine Warfare (MW), Special Warfare (SW), and Battle Group
(BG) Support. (PEO SUB-X, 1993)
The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) met in August 1992 and recommended
approval of Milestone (Approval to Conduct Concept Studies). The Under Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) approved Milestone via the New Attack Submarine Acquisition
Decision Memorandum on 28 August 1992. Milestone I (Approval to Begin a New
Acquisition Program) was subsequently approved in August 1994. Milestone II
(Approval to Enter Engineering & Manufacturing Development) was approved in June
1995. Low rate initial production (LRJP) is expected to begin in FY-98. Lead ship
delivery is expected in April 2004. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is expected in FY-
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06. Milestone III (Approval for Full Rate Production (FRP)) is expected in FY-08. (PEO
SUB-X, 1993)
Electric Boat, the design contractor for the New Attack Submarine, chose
IBM/Dassault's computer-aided three-dimensional interactive (CATIA) digital design
system and CATIA data manager (CDM) for the base set of computer-aided design,
engineering, and manufacturing application programs in the design and production of the
New Attack Submarine (Kowenhaven and Harris, 1997). CATIA and CDM allow the
design data to be available on a digital network. This allows production to proceed
without manual or graphical hardcopy transfer of the data. The same design data can
drive numerically controlled manufacturing processes using the design database rather
than physical drawings. (Kowenhaven and Harris, 1997) CATIA is a leading computer-
aided design/computer-aided manufacturing (CAD/CAM) application. CATIA was
developed by Dassault Systemes and is distributed, marketed and supported worldwide by
IBM. CATIA is used in the aerospace, appliance, architecture, automotive, construction,
consumer goods, electronics, furniture, machinery, medical, mold and die, and
shipbuilding industries. CATIA provides for a STEP interface to exchange data. The
CATIA/CDM System has the capability to generate design data in the internationally
recognized STEP format. (IBM/Dassault, 1997)
2. The Rapid Acquisition of Manufactured Parts (RAMP) Program
Concept development of the Rapid Acquisition ofManufactured Parts (RAMP)
Program was begun in 1982 by the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP). The
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purpose of the program was to fill a need in the Navy's supply system to obtain hard-to-
procure, out-of-production spare parts for older weapon systems. These parts were
becoming increasingly more expensive to procure in the limited quantities needed due to
nonavailability of data packages for the weapon systems and the diminishing domestic
manufacturing sources for production of these parts. The RAMP program was designed
to use intelligent digital data in a computer integrated manufacturing (CIM)/flexible
manufacturing environment to produce these parts quickly and at a lower unit cost.
(Peterson, 1993)
Intertwined with the problem of finding contractors, procurement lead time was
becoming excessive. The late 1980's average lead time for no-longer-available parts was
approximately 300 days (Peterson. 1993). A goal of the RAMP Program is to reduce that
lead time to less than 30 days.
Technology in manufacturing, although at the core of the RAMP Program, is not
the only technological advancement involved in the RAMP Program. The RAMP
Program calls for the application of technology in the Request For Proposal (RFP), bid
preparation, bid submission, bid evaluation, and contract award. These elements can
easily make use of Electronic Commerce and Electronic Data Interchange technology.
Physical development ofRAMP hardware and software was initiated under an
R&D contract with the South Carolina Research Authority (SCRA) in 1987. SCRA is a
not-for-profit, state-sponsored organization dedicated to encouraging technological
innovation within South Carolina. The contract called for SCRA to exercise overall
technological management of the RAMP Program. SCRA employed the resources of a
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consortium of four private industry firms to develop the required technological
applications in a team effort.
The fundamental RAMP Program objective was "To develop and prototype, for
technology transfer to the commercial industrial base, the capability for data-driven, just-
in-time, low-volume manufacturing of hard-to-obtain items." (SCRA, 1997) The
secondary program objectives were stated as: "Reduction in acquisition lead times,
particularly for items of supply with limited sources; Increased competition via technical
data packages developed through reverse engineering; Continuous improvements to
manufacturing through development and deployment of modern process control and data
management capabilities." (SCRA, 1997)
Progress on RAMP was made quickly. The first RAMP "cell" was ready to begin
manufacturing parts in late 1990. This cell was located at the Naval Aviation Depot at
Cherry Point, North Carolina.
In order to achieve the transfer of the technological use of intelligent digital data to
the commercial manufacturing base, a goal was to first demonstrate the capabilities of
these processes by calling upon specific areas of manufacturing expertise within the
Department ofDefense operated manufacturing facilities. RAMP processes have been
implemented at 16 sites throughout the U. S. Defense Depot maintenance and defense
supplier community including Army and Air Force Sites. The specific processes
implemented at these sites are focused on each site's mission and specific manufacturing
area of expertise. For example, The Naval Aviation Depot at Cherry Point, North
Carolina repairs aircraft. For this purpose it requires both the capability to manufacture
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general mechanical parts as well as the more specialized capability to manufacture aircraft
engine blades and vanes. (SCRA, 1997)
The RAMP Program's application of intelligent digital data is no longer a
Department ofDefense "in-house" system. The desired goal of transferring this
technology to the commercial industrial base has been achieved. Seven private sector
organizations have implemented or will shortly implement intelligent digital data
processes in support of the RAMP Program.
Table 2. 1 lists the current and projected sites along with their specific RAMP
process capabilities. SCRA, the technology developer maintains a complete program
capability. Additionally, a site has been established in Leeds, England in an effort to afford
the United Kingdom Defense Ministry the same capabilities the RAMP Program provides
to the United States Department of Defense.
a. RAMP Process Capabilities.
Because there are varying capabilities within RAMP facilities, the
capabilities indicated in Table 2. 1 are described below:
- RAMP Product Translation System for Mechanical Parts (RPTS MP) This
function allows the conversion of the design data into intelligent digital data and allows for




























SCRA, CHARLESTON X X X X X X X X X
SMALC SACRAMENTO X
SPCC/ICP X




TRF KINGS BAY X











FOCUS: HOPE X X
LEEDS, UK X X
DSCR RICHMOND X
Table 2.1. Current RAMP Facilities and Capabilities (RAMP, 1997).
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- Mechanical Parts (MP). This function allows for the manufacture of
mechanical parts from intelligent digital data.
- Engine Blade and Vane Fabrication (EB/VF). This function allows for the
manufacture of aircraft engine blades and vanes.
- RAMP Lite. This function was designed to assist Navy Intermediate
Maintenance Activities (EVLAs) to lower costs and improve efficiency by providing a
system that facilitates the production of a wide variety of mechanical parts. This system
can be located shipboard to provide a deployable RAMP facility. A RAMP Lite capability
is installed at the Trident Refit Facility in Kings Bay, Georgia. This facility is the
Intermediate Maintenance Facility for the Trident Ballistic Missile Submarines homeported
in Kings Bay. Additionally, RAMP Lite has been installed on board the USS Emory S.
Land (AS-39), a submarine tender homeported in Norfolk, Virginia, as well as at the Ship
Repair Facility (SRF) in Yokosuka, Japan. The Yokosuka SRF is the intermediate
maintenance activity for the U. S. Navy ships forward-based in Yokosuka.
- RAMP Product Translation System Printed Wire Assembly (RPTS PWA).
This function converts design data into intelligent digital data for manufacture of Printed
Wire Assemblies (PWA). PWAs are the most common form of printed circuits. They are
used in those applications in which the maximum number of interconnections (conductors)
in a given area are desired, while minimizing cost. (McGraw-FIill, 1987)
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- Generative Process Planning Environment (GPPE). The GPPE is a state-of-
the-art process planning system that can accept and process intelligent digital product data
to quickly produce the bill of material, the bill of activities (or routing), and time estimates
associated with the manufacture of the product described by the intelligent digital data.
The Quote Preparation Manager can then use this information to rapidly produce highly
accurate job quotes. (SCRA, 1997)
- Quote Request Manager (QRM). This capability allows Navy procuring
activities to prepare electronic RFPs and facilitates receipt and evaluation of electronic
proposals. The activities which have QRM capability include the Ship's Parts Control
Center (SPCC) and Inventory Control Point (ICP) in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, the
Aviation Supply Office (ASO) and Inventory Control Point (ICP) in Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, and Defense Supply Center Richmond, Virginia. These activities are the
item inventory managers for the parts in the Navy and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
supply systems and are therefore the activities responsible for obtaining a part when
needed. These are the activities that request quotes from contractors to manufacture
parts.
- Quote Preparation Manager (QPM). This capability allows a RAMP facility
to prepare quotes for items requested for bid. The goal of the RAMP Program is to
"enroll" as many manufacturers as possible and provide them with, as a minimum, QPM
capability.
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3. RAMP Program Results
The Naval Air Warfare Center, Indianapolis installed a printed wire assembly cell
with both RPTS PWA as well as PWA functions. Their 1996 production showed a 24
percent cost savings from traditional manufacturing, a 27 percent reduction in total cycle
time, a 83 percent reduction in rework, and a 74 percent reduction in the cost of repeat
orders. The Naval Engine Airfoil Center at Cherry Point, North Carolina is demonstrating
cost savings in excess of $20 Million annually. (SCRA, 1997)
The RAMP facility at the Anniston Army Depot produced over 50,000 parts in its
first year. As ofMarch 1997, Anniston had filled over 1700 orders, providing 136,036
parts primarily to support Army combat vehicles. According to Anniston, if the material is
on hand, customers can expect a one-hour turnaround on repeat orders (Interview-Z,
1997).
RAMP has proven very valuable in the support ofthe AVENGER Class Mine
Countermeasures and OSPREY Class Coastal Minehunter ships. Both classes have low
magnetic signature, Italian-made Isotta-Fraschini Diesel Engines installed. These diesel
engines were experiencing a mean time between failure (MTBF) of less than 250 hours
and a supply material availability (SMA) of less than 50 percent. Procurement lead times
for certain parts had reached 480 days. After RAMP involvement in the program, supply
material availability (SMA) was increased to greater than 90 percent and the 480-day lead
time had been reduced to 10 days. (Interview-Z, 1997)
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR NAVY SUPPLY SUPPORT
Nevertheless, the world remains a dangerous and highly uncertain place,
and the United States likely will face a number of significant challenges to
its security between now and 20 15...To sustain this position of leadership,
the United States must maintain ready and versatile forces capable of
conducting a wide range of military operations... Absent a marked
deterioration in world events, the nation is unlikely to support significantly
greater resources dedicated to national defense than it does now.
(Cohen, 1997)
These excerpts from the Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
suggest that the United States military will continue to have to do more with less. The
issue developed in this chapter is formed from the following statements: (1) The Navy
operates a varied arsenal ofweapon systems. The commitments for the forces operating
these systems and therefore Operating Tempo (OPTEMPO) are not decreasing. (2) The
funding to support the Navy's operations is not growing. (3) In order to support these
operations the Navy must look for more cost effective ways of conducting its support
functions—especially in light of the focus of the QDR on force modernization. (4) The
Navy maintains an expensive spare and repair parts inventory. (5) The Navy has
developed a technology application (RAMP Program) for the use of digital design data
which has proven itself capable of the timely and cost effective manufacturing of no-
longer-available parts; and (6) The Navy's newest weapon systems under procurement are
using advanced technology in computer-aided design and manufacturing.
This series of statements is explored in this chapter. This exploration leads in
subsequent chapters to the answers to the following questions. Can the Navy apply
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current advances in digital data technology in the design and manufacture of its weapon
systems to reduce the spare and repair parts inventory? And if so, what are the costs
involved?
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BUDGET
"The greatest challenge we face in this new world order is the constrained budget
environment in which we operate" (Perry, 1996). The Department of Defense Budget
continues to be at the forefront of the debate over cuts in discretionary spending. The
1998 Federal Budget as submitted by the President totals $1 .69 trillion. Of this amount,
$260 billion (15 percent) is for defense spending. Domestic spending totals $284 billion
(17 percent). The remainder of the budget is earmarked for entitlement spending. Of the
funds cited for discretionary spending, defense spending is roughly 47 percent. (OMB,
1997)
There has been no real growth in defense spending since 1985 and, in fact, from
1985 to 1997 there has been a 40 percent decline in real budget authority for the
Department of Defense (Perry, 1997). The Quadrennial Defense Review analysis of
America's defense needs from 1997 to 2015 projected stable annual defense budgets of
roughly $250 Billion in constant FY 1997 dollars (Cohen, 1997). A "flat-line" budget in
real terms combined with a relatively constant worldwide military commitment and new
weapon systems procurement highlights the funding issue facing the military.
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B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPARE AND REPAIR PARTS
INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
The Department of Defense manages the largest inventory in the world. The value
of this inventory at the end ofFY-96 was $67 billion (constant FY-95 dollars) (Emahiser,
1997). The Department of Defense inventory is comprised of the inventory managed by
each service as well as that managed by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Despite
progress in reducing this inventory since 1989, when the value was $107 billion (constant
FY-95 dollars), and the Secretary of Defense's forecasted end-of-year value for FY-03 of
$48 billion (constant FY-95 dollars), the management of the Department ofDefense
inventory system has been called into question in numerous General Accounting Office
(GAO) reports. (Emahiser, 1997; GAO/NSIAD-96-156, 1996; GAO/NSIAD-95-2, 1994;
GAO/NSIAD-95-85,1995)
The GAO has made numerous recommendations to reduce not only the level of
inventory but also the costs of maintaining the inventory. In 1995 the Department of
Defense spent approximately $24 billion to maintain its inventory (GAO/NSIAD-96-156,
1996). This figure includes the costs of buying, storing, repairing, and issuing the parts.
The recommendations to reduce the cost of maintaining the inventory include adoption of
best commercial practices, reducing acquisition lead time, and improved analysis for
diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages. (GAO/NSIAD-96-156, 1996;
GAO/NSIAD-94-235,1994; GAO/NSIAD-95-2, 1994; GAO/NSIAD-95-85,
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1995; GAO/NSIAD-95-142, 1995) The constrained budget and recommendations to
reduce the inventory costs are key factors in the motivation for this study.
C. NAVY INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
Because the focus of this investigation is on the application of intelligent digital
technology to reduce the spare and repair parts inventory for the New Attack Submarine,
the structure, pricing, and operation of the Navy's inventory system is discussed next to
provide the reader with a context to understand potential applications of intelligent digital
data within this system.
1. Structure and Pricing of the Navy Inventory System
Ship and submarine spare and repair part inventories are generally separated into
two categories, Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL) and the Wholesale
Inventory. The COSAL is that portion of the spare and repair parts inventory that is
maintained onboard the ship and is sometimes referred to as on board repair parts
(OBRP). The wholesale inventory is that which is maintained at DLA Depots. The
inventories are structured using several different models. The underlying theme to all the
models, however, is that a demand for each part is calculated based on several factors.
These factors include the part population in the entire weapon systems inventory (not just
on a per platform basis), the predicted or established failure rate of the part, the criticality
of the part to the subsystem, and the criticality of the subsystem to the weapon system
mission.
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An example of a COSAL model is the "0.5 FLSIP Plus" model used for the non-
steam and electric, hull, mechanical and electrical parts (i.e., non-propulsion plant related
parts which are hull, mechanical or electrical in nature) for the SEAWOLF Class . The
acronym FLSEP stands for Fleet Logistics Support Improvement Program. In this model a
part qualifying as a demand-based allowance item (item depth to satisfy 90 percent of
demand over a 90-day period) must have an expected usage greater than once per quarter.
Items with less than this expected usage but greater than once every two years qualify as
insurance items for mission vital systems/parts and are stocked at a depth of one
replacement unit. The "plus" term refers to additional parts that are added based on
CASREP or 3M usage data or technical overrides2 . (NAVSUP 553, 1991)
The general philosophy of the wholesale model starts with demand being
calculated from the failure rate (predicted or demonstrated) multiplied times the total
population (population of the part in the entire defense arsenal). Using this predicted
demand value, a cost difference analysis (COSDIF) is performed to determine whether it is
more costly to stock the part or not stock the part. The COSDIF is an expected value
analysis that compares the first two years' total expected costs of stocking an item to the
expected cost of not stocking the item and subsequently needing it over the same time
period. In performing the COSDIF analysis, consideration is given to the costs of
2 The Navy's Equipment Casualty Reporting System (CASREP) is used to document
degradation to weapon system capability due to material failure. The system serves as both a
combat capabilities status reporting system for operational commanders as well as a logistics
support requirements identification and feedback system. The Navy's Maintenance and Material
Management (3M) System is the guidance and reporting system for preventive and corrective
equipment maintenance aboard all ships and applicable shore stations.
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procurement, cost of issuing, holding cost, premium paid when buying on demand,
shortage cost, frequency of demand, frequency of procurement, demand, unit price, and
production lead time. If the COSDIF analysis shows it is cheaper to stock than not stock
the item, then the item is stocked as a demand-based item with an initial depth of expected
demand during a procurement lead time plus one quarter, plus safety stock.
In addition to "demand-based" items, items are also identified to be stocked as
"non-demand based" items. Non-demand based items can be separated into several
categories. The two main categories of non-demand based items are insurance items and
Numeric Stockage Objective (NSO) items. An insurance item is an essential item for
which no failure is predicted through normal usage, but, if failure is experienced or loss
occurs through accident, abnormal equipment/system failure or other unexpected
occurrences, lack of an immediately available replacement would seriously hamper the
operational capability of the weapon system (NAVSUP 553, 1991). An NSO item is an
essential item for which the probability of demand is so low that it does not meet the
demand-based stockage criteria. If the lack of a replacement item would seriously hamper
the operational capability of a weapon system the item is stocked as non-demand-based at
a depth of one or two units (NAVSUP 553, 1991). Other categories include items needed
on a non-recurring or sporadic basis, items procured on a life-of-type buy, and items not
fully consumed during a one-time or non-repetitive program but which should be retained
for possible future use.
Customers of the Navy/DLA supply system make purchases from the DLA
Depots. These purchases are made through the Military Standard Requisition and Issue
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Process (MILSTRIP). Each customer requisition serves as both a communication of a
customer requirement to the cognizant ICP or Defense Supply Center (DSC) as well as a
funded customer order.
Inventory items purchased by the supply system are held at DLA Depots until they
are requisitioned by a customer. The amount reimbursed by customers to the depot for
the part is the sum of the procurement cost of the part plus a surcharge or cost recovery
factor. This cost recovery factor is comprised of all of the depot's costs of doing business
including the cost of supply operations, transportation, inventory losses, obsolescence,
price stabilization/inflation, and inventory maintenance, as well as a portion of the DLA
Headquarters operating costs. (Naval Postgraduate School, 1996; Ahern, 1991)
The cost recovery factors vary from fiscal year to fiscal year. The variations are
due to the requirement for the working capital funds in which the supply management
business areas operate, to attempt to break even. The cost recovery factor must be
adjusted on an annual basis to target a break-even point with the forecast business volume.
The variation in cost recovery factors is shown in Table 3.1. This table displays the cost
recovery factors for NAVICP since FY-91. Fiscal Year 1991 was chosen as the lower
bound on the historical values because it was it was in FY-91 that Defense Management
Review Decision (DMRD) 901 took effect. DMRD 901 mandated that all the costs of
doing business in the supply management business area now be recouped using the
surcharge. The DLA cost recovery factors for this period were not available (see
Appendix B). The factors are shown graphically in Figure 3.1.
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History of Cost Recovery Factors for NAVICP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
NAVICP Consummable 17.1 30.9 27.0 34.6 51.8 58.1 13.5 20.0 52.7
NAVICP DLR (Standard) 10.7 23.3 23.8 33.4 56.1 62.7 17.8 34.2 68.3
NAVICP DLR (Net) 18.0 26.5 21.9 30.0 51.0 48.3 3.4 17.2 47.5
Table 3.1. History ofNAVICP Cost Recovery Factors
Cost Recovery Factor History
70
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Figure 3.1. History ofNAVICP Cost Recovery Factors
The customer funding for spare and repair parts is allocated from the Operations
and Maintenance Navy appropriation category. These funds are appropriated on an
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annual basis. The Navy/DLA supply systems operate in the Supply Management Business
Area of the Navy Working Capital Fund or Defense Working Capital Fund. These
Working Capital Funds operate as revolving funds in that the reimbursements from
customers are used for restocking the parts inventory with a break-even objective.
However, the Working Capital Funds do receive funds from procurement accounts to
support outfitting weapon systems entering service. Currently, the Navy Inventory
Control Points manage only about five percent of the inventory that supports its weapons
systems. This five percent is predominantly depot level repairable items (DLRs). The
other 95 percent is consummable items which are managed by DLA. (Interview-AC,
1997)
2. Operation of the Navy Inventory System
The Navy inventory system, despite the fact that the RAMP Program began in
1990, continues to operate primarily outside the intelligent digital data environment. An
overview of operations both in and out of an intelligent digital data environment is
provided.
i
a. Operations in the Absence ofIntelligent Digital Data
When a spare part is needed for a ship or aircraft, a requisition is submitted to the
cognizant supply department supporting the activity. If the part is held in stock, it is
issued to fill the requisition. If the part is not stocked locally, the requisition is passed to
an ICP or DSC, which are connected via computer to all DLA Depots. If the part is
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available in the supply system, the DLA Depot nearest the requiring activity ships it. This
sequence of events occurs for over 80 percent of the requisitions submitted. In the case
where the required part is not available in the supply system, the requirement is passed to
the ICP's or DSC's procurement activity. The procurement activity then attempts to
purchase the part.
In order to be able to purchase the part, the procurement activity requires the
specifications of the part. If the specifications are available, the procuring activity issues a
Request for Proposal (RFP). If the specifications are not available, the part has to be
reverse engineered to obtain the necessary design specifications in order to issue an RFP.
The RFP invites interested contractors to submit a proposal for manufacturing the part.
The interested contractors then submit a bid indicating cost and schedule. The procuring
activity evaluates the proposals submitted and awards the contract based on "best value"
to the government. (Burton, 1990; DOD 5000.2R, 1996)
b. Operations in the Intelligent Digital Data Environment
Intelligent digital data may be able to provide supply support when it is
determined that the part is not available within the Navy's/DLA's supply system. The
process to use the intelligent digital data is multi-step. The part is first analyzed for the
potential for CIM/RAMP manufacturing. This can easily be done if the design data are
available in digital format. It could also be done by examining hard copy design data. If
the part appears to be within the capabilities ofCIM/RAMP, then the procuring activity
would transmit an RFP over an electronic network with the specifications for the
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necessary part in digital format3 . The activities in the intelligent digital data/RAMP
network would receive the RFP via computer. A CIM/RAMP cell receiving the RFP
would evaluate both the cell's capability and capacity to produce the part. If capability
and capacity exist within the cell, then the cell produces and transmits an electronic bid or
quote. The bidder who provides best value to the government is then awarded the
contract electronically. (Burton, 1990; DOD 5000.2R, 1996)
Intelligent digital data do not provide all of the answers to the spare parts
acquisition problems. The supply system operations with intelligent digital data are still
hampered by the non-availability of design data. If the design data are available, but not
already in digital format, the data must be converted to digital format. This conversion
comes at a cost which is discussed in Chapter V. Ifthe design data are not available, then
the part is reverse engineered and the resulting design data are generated in digital format.
In order to reverse engineer a part, the reverse engineering facility must have the part.
Retrieving the part adds additional time to the replacement process.
D. POTENTIAL FOR SAVINGS
The supply component of the Navy's mission consumes 50 to 65 percent ofthe
Navy budget (NAVSUP 553, 1991). In 1996 the Navy inventory was valued at $33.7
billion (GAO/NSIAD-97-47, 1997). These two statements, in company with the budget
3 The use of electronic commerce is the preferred method. The RAMP system as
described in Chapter II is still in its relative infancy with respect to creation of the "RAMP
network" of manufacturers. In reality the RFP and bids may not be transmitted between QPM
and QPR capable organizations.
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figures and trends discussed above, suggest the potential for savings with the application
of intelligent digital data to the spare and repair parts inventory exists. Even a small
percentage savings becomes a worthwhile objective.
Under the current system, the wholesale inventory for the submarine force can be
expected to increase. The decrease in the total number of submarines in the force will
decrease both the range (number of different parts) and depth (quantities of each part) of
the wholesale inventory required to support the submarine force. The addition of a new
class of submarine will increase the range and depth requirements of the wholesale
inventory. The mandate to prototype the first four hulls of the New Attack Submarine
will further increase the range of the wholesale inventory. Traditionally, force
modernization has resulted in significant inventory growth as parts were purchased to
support new weapon systems (Emahiser, 1997). Simply, the more diverse the submarine
force makeup, the more diverse the inventory requirements, the larger the wholesale
inventory, and the more costly the inventory support for the submarine force.
The Navy supply system, despite its significant experience from years ofbuying,
holding and providing parts when needed and its complex computer models and highly
capable computer systems, must still make tradeoffs between affordability and
responsiveness in sustaining the complex and constantly changing arsenal ofweapon




Performing opinion, archival, and empirical research enables a systematic
interpretation of the costs of applying significant advances in the use of digital data in the
production and manufacturing environment to the Navy's inventory system. The inherent
weaknesses of the research techniques and biases of the researcher were hopefully
minimized through the use of these multiple research methods and through a conscious
awareness of the deficiencies and their impact upon data gathering and analysis.
The methodology required for this research was divided into the following phases:
(1) review of pertinent literature, (2) interviews with individuals at associated agencies, (3)
collection of program data, (4) reduction of data, (5) analysis of data, and (6)
conclusions and recommendations. This research identified specific costs ofthe use of
intelligent digital data within the Navy supply system. The combination of opinion,
archival, and empirical research in the literature review, interviews, and data collection
provided a balance of qualitative and quantitative data. This approach increased the
probability of achieving success in examining the potential application of intelligent digital
data to the Navy supply system.
A. REVIEW OF PERTINENT LITERATURE
A review of the pertinent literature on the New Attack Submarine Program, the
SEAWOLF Submarine Program, the RAMP Program, the Navy and other Department of
Defense (DOD) Inventory Systems, Flexible Manufacturing Technology/Computer-
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Integrated Manufacturing, and Federal Acquisition Regulations was conducted. This
literature was specifically examined to identify the difficulties in applying CIM/RAMP to
the New Attack Submarine. Primary information was collected from instructions,
directives, reports, and contracts supporting the New Attack Submarine, SEAWOLF, and
RAMP Programs and the DOD supply system. Secondary information was collected from
periodical and journal articles as well as related theses and General Accounting Office
reports. This archival research provided a basis for formulating the subject matter of the
opinion research. It also provided a comparative framework when evaluating the results
of opinion research.
B. INTERVIEWS
Interviews were conducted over a period of eleven months. Interviews were
conducted with 36 individuals from seven different organizations. Interviews were
conducted with representatives of the following commands and agencies: Naval Supply
Systems Command (i.e., RAMP Program Office, Inventory Control Points, and Fleet
Material Support Office (FMSO)), Naval Sea Systems Command (i.e., New Attack
Submarine and SEAWOLF Submarine Programs), Defense Logistics Agency and the
South Carolina Research Authority (SCRA) RAMP Program Office The purpose of the
interviews was to gain insight and perspective into the programs beyond that which is
available in the literature, as well as obtain data not available elsewhere.
Individual viewpoints, group norms, and the culture of the organizations were
considered in evaluating the data collected during the interview process. Opinion research
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helps reveal the attitudes, beliefs, and understandings of key individuals. However, the
researcher's design of questions, selection of interview candidates, and the method of the
interview are inherent biases introduced into the research.
The majority of the interviews were conducted by telephone and electronic mail.
Individuals typically responded differently to the researcher on the telephone and through
electronic mail then in a face-to-face interview. The interview medium could influence the
interviewees' descriptions and opinions ofwhy contracts were structured as they were,
why certain data were procured and the associated costs. This is one of the inherent
drawbacks to conducting research on organizations which are geographically located
thousands of miles and several time zones from the researcher.
C. COLLECTION OF PROGRAM DATA
Data were collected from submarine program offices as well as from the Naval
Supply Systems Command to attempt to quantifiably define two aspects of the research:
(1) What percentage of parts from the New Attack Submarine could be
manufactured in an intelligent digital data environment?
(2) What is the cost of obtaining the design data to be able to manufacture
the parts in an intelligent digital data environment?
The goal of this part of the data collection was to identify a set of parts from the
New Attack Submarine that would be likely candidates for manufacture in a CIM/RAMP
facility. The analysis was conducted on a single subsystem of the New Attack Submarine.
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Criteria were established for selecting the subsystem These criteria are discussed in
Chapter V. An example of the criteria used is that candidate choices were limited to those
systems that did not have security classification restrictions. This selection criterion was
intended to avoid limitations on the handling and distribution of the thesis. Alternate
candidate subsystems were also identified in the event that data were not available for the
primary system selected. The Reelable Towed Array Handling System was chosen
because it satisfied the established criteria. This is the system that allows the submarine to
stream and retrieve the towed sonar array. The towed sonar array is part of the acoustic
sensor suite on board the submarine. The handling system has a cross-section of types of
components. They include hydraulics, seawater systems, mechanical cable handling
systems as well as control and indicator circuitry and all associated connectors. The
intention was to evaluate a system on the New Attack Submarine to identify candidate
parts for potential CIM/RAMP manufacture. However, the system drawings for the New
Attack Submarine were not fully approved and available for review. The alternative
system selected was the similar system on the SEAWOLF submarine. During the course
of data collection on the SEAWOLF RTAHS, it was determined that the appropriate
documentation and drawings were not available to the researcher. This caused data
collection to proceed to the second alternate research path, the Reelable Towed Array
Handling System (RTAHS) on the LOS ANGELES (688) Class submarine. A review of
available drawings and technical manuals and discussions with program personnel
confirmed that the system designs were very similar. A complete parts lists was obtained
for the LOS ANGELES Class RTAHS.
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The parts analysis was conducted to identify parts that were potential candidates for
RAMP manufacturing based on their design characteristics.
Determination of the cost of the design data was also attempted. However, due to
the lack of documented data on even current shipbuilding contracts in the Naval Sea
Systems Command program offices, this effort proved impossible. The contracts and
records lacked the metrics to track and report the costs of the data.
D. VALIDATION OF DATA
The data collected were first reviewed to ensure that no gaps or contradictions
existed. The data were then reduced to a manageable format by separating them into
categories for further analysis. Five categories were established to describe the type of
part and whether this part was CEM/RAMP manufacturable. Cross-referencing checks
were conducted between the part nomenclature and the system drawings to ascertain the
proper category of part.
Much of the data used in the analysis were from the interviews. In many cases
actual numbers were unavailable from archival data sources to validate or clarify the
interview data. The lack of documented data resulted primarily from the fact that cost
figures and acquisition decisions discussed in the interviews were often from preliminary
negotiations which were never included in the final contract.
In order to minimize researcher bias, the researcher listened to question responses,
observed individual behavior and analyzed the data before conclusions were drawn. The
researcher attempted to minimize the expression of his own emotions, beliefs, or opinions
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about the subject ofthe interview or in response to the interviewee's responses during the
research.
E. ANALYSIS OF DATA
The data collected was used to construct a net present value estimation model.
The model was used to estimate the maximum price the Navy should pay to obtain
intelligent digital data for parts over a variety of combinations of part-specific
characteristics. Finally, both the CIM/RAMP manufacturable part analysis and the net
present value estimation model were used to obtain an estimated range for the potential
for cost savings with the application of intelligent digital data.
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V. DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
This chapter discusses the data collected to conduct an analysis of the costs of
using intelligent digital data to reduce the spare and repair parts inventory for the New
Attack Submarine. The discussion includes information concerning the technical
feasibility of such an application, the need or market for such an application, a measure of
the Navy's interest in such an application, and the process and costs associated with
acquisition of the design data.
A. TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF INTELLIGENT DIGITAL DATA
APPLICATION
The question of technical feasibility of the application of intelligent digital data to
reduce the spare and repair parts inventory of the New Attack Submarine depends both on
the availability of the design data in intelligent digital format as well as the technology to
employ that data in parts production. Recall from the discussion in Chapter II that the
manufacturing technology has been developed through the RAMP Program. Thus, the
remaining question is whether the design data are available in an appropriate intelligent
digital format which can be used by this technology.
Design data acquisition has been an "on again, off again" experience during recent
Department of Defense shipbuilding programs. In order to answer the question of
whether the design data are available in intelligent digital format, the question must first be
answered as to whether it is available in any format. Design data, when provided, have
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historically been in hardcopy format as well as microform/microfiche. Because the
decisions made for current programs were in part based on the data acquisition experience
of previous programs, decisions for previous programs were also analyzed to gain insight
into the design data acquisition process for the New Attack Submarine.
1. Historical Perspective on Design Data Acquisition
Examining the acquisition strategies from a recent submarine program was helpful
in establishing what design data were obtained, why they were obtained and at what cost.
The SEAWOLF Program strategy is examined. Additionally, the acquisition strategy for a
specific equipment that was intended to be installed on a number of classes of submarines
is also examined. This equipment acquisition strategy is examined both from the
perspective of strategy for design data acquisition as well as the problems associated with
design data acquisition.
a, The SEAWOLF Program
The SEAWOLF Program acquisition strategy initially included the
procurement of a complete set of design data. The purpose for obtaining all of the design
data was to maximize competition. "With 29 hulls to build, this translates into a lot of
pumps and valves" (Interview-A, 1997). If the government owned the data, then it could
be made available to contractors other than the developer to obtain the lowest price, using
competitive bids. New contractors wouldn't have to recoup the up-front design costs
because they would be building to an existing print (Interview-A, 1997). The only design
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data that would not be acquired are that which contractors were not willing to provide.
When the Level III design data requirement was included in the original contract, no
systems, equipment, or components were excluded or stated as not available by the prime
contractor/design yard (Interview-A, 1997).
However, there are at least two reasons for contractors being unwilling to
supply the design data. The first is the proprietary nature of the data. (Interview-B, 1997;
Interview-G, 1997; Interview-O, 1997) Some contractors considered the design data
proprietary, how the contractors manufactured the part was what provided them with a
competitive edge in the industry. For others the proprietary concern was the "guaranteed"
future income stream from being the sole contractor of the part(s).
One interviewee offered his opinion on the unwillingness of industry to
forfeit design data without "appropriate" compensation. A likely reason for the often cost
prohibitive nature of the data is as a hedge against the recent volatility in major weapon
system acquisition contracts (e.g., SEAWOLF). Contractors have been "burned" by the
political volatility surrounding major defense weapons acquisition programs. Programs
that have been drastically cut back or canceled in total have made contractors very wary of
investment in new programs. Proposals were submitted and contracts signed with prices
that did not necessarily cover contractor costs, much less provide profit in the short term,
but were expected to recoup costs and provide profit in the long term. When the program
was subsequently canceled or drastically cut back, the contractor was left "holding the
bag" for the startup and initial tooling costs, with little hope of accruing future profits. It
is this type of experience that causes the price quotes for design data in new programs to
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be "marked up" as a hedge against program cancellation and to assure a future income
stream. (Interview-B, 1997)
Some contractors were unable to provide the design data in intelligent
digital format. In some instances, despite the fact that design data for the part could be
made available, the manufacturing process for that part could not be captured in digital
form. Portions of such processes are performed by master craftsmen whose actions and
intuitive feel for their craft preclude their duplication by numerically controlled machines.
This was definitely the case for certain components which have sound-quieting tolerances
associated with their operation. (Interview-F, 1996)
The SEAWOLF Program budget included approximately $3.0 million for
acquisition of design data for the class in the lead ship contract (SSN21). The program
was budgeted to spend another $1.5 million for design data for the class in the contract for
the second hull (SSN22). The plan for the remainder of the class was to budget
approximately $1.0 million per submarine thereafter to obtain design data for the class.
(Interview-A, 1997; Interview-P, 1997) For this 29-ship class, the total amount to be
spent on design data for the class would have totaled over $30.0 million. By the time the
$30.0 million would be spent there would be a sizeable collection of design data.
Originally, there was no prioritization ofwhat design data were the most important to
obtain first. The result was that whatever design data became available first was what
would be purchased first. Eventually, the necessary data would be acquired; so which
came first wasn't of great concern. (Interview-A, 1997; Interview-S, 1997)
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However, the number of ships to be funded in this class was drastically cut
from 29 to 12 and then down to two. Eventually, a third ship was added to the class. The
resultant reduction in class size drastically changed the acquisition strategy for obtaining
design data. It was determined that there would be limited utility in obtaining the small
amount of design data that could be purchased with the $1.0 million programmed for
SSN23. It was determined that the $1 .0 million could be better spent elsewhere in the
program. Now, with only $4.5 million (from SSN21 and SSN22 contracts) to spend on
design data, the program office's revised approach to acquiring design data became "don't
just buy one drawing with the $4.5 million." (Interview-A, 1997; Interview-O, 1997)
As of 14 July 1997, the design yard for the SEAWOLF Class, Newport
News Shipbuilding (NNS), had 8,131 Level III drawings on file for the SEAWOLF Class
(Interview-A, 1997). It is unclear how many or what percentage of the systems and parts
are covered by these drawings. The request for this information was made to the program
office, however no response was received. A simple average cost per drawing is a
relatively meaningless number. Without knowing what systems, equipment, or
components are described by these drawings and how many drawings it takes to describe a
component, there is no apparent way of calculating the cost of the design data for a
particular component. (Interview-A, 1997)
As part of the design contract for the SEAWOLF submarine, the design
yard (i.e., NNS) is responsible for technical review of contractor drawings, forwarding of
the drawings to NAVSEA for review and approval, and disposition and resolution of
NAVSEA comments on the contractor drawings obtained by the design yard as the
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procurement activity. The responsibilities also include entering ofthe drawings into the
Master Drawing Schedule (MDS) and scanning the hard copy drawings into the Advanced
Technical Information System (ATIS). MDS is the master drawing database for the ship
class. ATIS is a digitized index ofIndex of Technical Publications (ITP) and Ship 's
Drawing Index (SDI) products with viewing capabilities. A person can search for an item,
call it up, and view it on computer either onboard ship or ashore at support related
organizations. (Interview-A, 1997; Interview-B, 1997)
The design yard estimates that the average cost to process a drawing is
about $5,000. This figure includes the processing of the drawing as described above. The
data on how much the design yard paid to obtain the contractor drawings was not
considered an important metric at the time of the acquisition and therefore wasn't obtained
and could not be recreated by the program office. (Interview-A, 1997)
2. Current Perspective on Design Data Acquisition - The New Attack
Submarine
The technical capability exists within the design yard to produce intelligent digital
data in support of the New Attack Submarine. However, the Navy has not contracted to
procure intelligent digital data for any part of the New Attack Submarine.
The New Attack Submarine Program, faced with the task of producing "an
affordable yet capable platform" (PEO Sub-X, 1993), did not include the requirement to
procure any Level III design data (Interview-B, 1997). The design data acquisition
experience of the SEAWOLF Program was analyzed and the determination was made that
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for the New Attack Submarine, "the benefit was not worth the cost" (Interview-B, 1997).
Section 85 of the New Attack Submarine design contract calls for Electric Boat to provide
only Level II design data. With respect to Level III data, the contract states, "The
contractor shall recommend for approval by NAVSEA the level of drawing detail needed
to support life cycle requirements." (PEO Sub-X, 1997) As of 15 July 1997, no
recommendations for Level III drawings have been submitted by the contractor, Electric
Boat, to NAVSEA (Interview-B, 1997). Since no recommendations for Level III data
have been submitted, no Level III data have been purchased and no cost data are therefore
available for Level III data for the New Attack Submarine.
There are several issues regarding technical feasibility that require further
discussion and clarification. The statement that "the New Attack Submarine is the first
weapon system designed solely on computer" (DOD Acquisition Reform Office, 1996),
does not mean that the design data for every component are entered in the design database
and therefore are available in intelligent digital format. The issues of proprietary data and
design data rights of the subcontractors, as well as the efficient employment of the
CAD/CAM and supporting database systems, limit the data that are entered (Interview-F,
1997, Interview-B, 1997).
Electric Boat has subcontracts with approximately 10,000 contractors.
Approximately 200 of these contractors account for 90 percent of the dollar value of the
subcontracts. Electric Boat "does not own the data rights to many ofthe components"
within the New Attack Submarine (Interview-B, 1997). Consequently, Electric Boat does
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not have the design data for those components, and therefore cannot enter the design data
into the CATIA database. (Interview-B, 1997)
Additionally, it is not clear how many of the contractors have CATIA capability.
Generally, CATIA is used by only the large contractors who have to perform systems
integration in design of the final product. For those contractors without CATIA, data
transfer would have to be conducted from the contractors' CAD/CAM applications to
CATIA. This data entry can be performed manually or electronically. But it is likely that
additional man-hours would have to be dedicated to a review of the data to ensure
completeness, a cost the program managers do not appear willing to bear. (Interview-B,
1997)
An additional problem with providing intelligent digital data is the way in which
CATIA is being employed by Electric Boat. The design yard is responsible for the design
of the submarine as a functioning weapon system. Functional interrelationships of
subsystems and system layout are part of that responsibility. To design the functioning
weapon system only requires the characteristics ofthe components relevant to the overall
design of the submarine (i.e., weight, material composition, external dimensions). To
enter more data than are absolutely necessary would increase the cost of the design
process. (Interview-B, 1997; Kowenhaven and Harris, 1997)
3. Problems Associated with Obtaining Design Data
The analysis thus far has focused on the historical design data acquisition of
submarine programs. Several problems with obtaining design data have already been
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identified. Further data concerning the cost prohibitive nature of obtaining design data as
well as the problem of data accuracy are provided next.
a, Cost Prohibitive Nature
As stated above, design data may be considered proprietary by contractors.
Contractors consider both long-run income from producing repair parts as well as whether
the data are proprietary and would effectively enable their competition to learn their
established trade "secrets". In at least one case involving the SEAWOLF Program, a
contractor (This contractor will be referred to by a fictitious name, Contractor V.) was
asked to submit a price quote for the procurement of the design data for a series of valves
that the contractor was producing to install on the SEAWOLF. Contractor V submitted a
price quote of $70 million for the design data for the valves. When asked "why such a
high price?" Contractor V replied that to sell the design data would effectively be selling
proprietary trade secrets, so that Contractor V would effectively be selling his business.
Contractor V estimated the current market value of his business as $70 million.
(Interview-B, 1997)
b. Data Accuracy
Some of the difficulties of obtaining the design data go beyond the
contractor's subjective valuation of that data. There is another aspect of procuring design
data which has a direct impact on cost. The lack of completeness and accuracy of the data
would require additional funding to correct or complete and might result in schedule
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delays in the delivery of the product. Historically, unless the data provided by the
contractor when the weapon system was produced had been proven to be complete and
correct, then chances of it being so were slim (Interview-C, 1997). A 1991 estimate by
the NAVSUP of the parts that were not stocked and had to be procured by the Navy
supply system suggested that 65 percent of the parts being procured lacked complete
technical data. (Peterson, 1993)
Currently, numerous reviews are being conducted of component and
equipment drawings in the design and approval process for submarine shipbuilding
programs. As described earlier, normally the design yard will obtain the drawings from
the contractor, review the drawings and forward them to the appropriate program office at
NAVSEA for review. Typically, the design yard then receives NAVSEA's comments,
resolves any issues with the contractor and resubmits the drawings for final approval.
(Interview-A, 1997; Interview-B, 1997) The review process for intelligent digital data
would require an additional step of proving the data can be understood by a computer-
integrated manufacturing facility. This additional step can be accomplished by running the
data through a computer model that simulates the CIM/RAMP facility or actually
manufacturing a part in a CIM/RAMP facility. (Interview-N, 1997; Interview-T, 1997)
This process of validating the design data is called "data prove out." Data prove out is
one means of assuring that the intelligent digital data received are suitable for future use.
The following case is a good illustration of the problems associated with design data
accuracy.
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c. Case: Atmosphere Control Equipmentfor the SEAWOLF
The information for this case was compiled from a series of three
interviews conducted at the Naval Sea Systems Command (Interview-C, 1997; Interview-
D, 1997; Interview-V, 1997). The individuals interviewed were from the ship design,
equipment design, and contracting areas. Citations have been omitted in the case.
Contractor names are fictitious.
One example of the various problems that can be encountered in obtaining
design data can be found in the acquisition of a specific piece of atmosphere control
equipment for the SEAWOLF Submarine. This type of equipment has been on
submarines since the STURGEON (637) and BENJAMIN FRANKLIN Class Submarines,
built between 1963 and 1975 (Moore, 1983). This equipment helps control the submarine
internal atmosphere within healthy limits. The existing equipment had been produced by
only one manufacturer (Contractor T) with only slightly updated versions since this
equipment was first designed and installed on submarines. The development of a more
advanced version of this equipment was begun in 1976 as a spinoff of the Fuel Cell used in
the Gemini spacecraft.
The initial contract that NAVSEA signed for this development effort was
with Contractor G, a large commercial contractor with significant defense related
contracts. The contract called for design development and prototype production of the
equipment. Design development continued through the mid 1980's. NAVSEA was not
satisfied with Contractor G's initial design. NAVSEA called into question certain aspects
of weight and the ability to withstand shock. Separate events resulted in Contractor G
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selling the division producing the atmosphere control equipment to Contractor H which
was a subsidiary of Contractor U. NAVSEA's dissatisfaction with the original design
coupled with the opportunity provided by the conditions of new ownership within
Contractor H, caused NAVSEA to initiate a contract modification. The modification
involved the addition ofnew requirements for the equipment that were not in the original
contract and modified other requirements in the original contract. The contract would
again result in Contractor H providing NAVSEA with both the design and an operational
prototype of the equipment. This contract modification cost NAVSEA an additional $15
million.
The resulting set of design (Level III) drawings were known to have
significant problems. By all accounts they were "about as bad as anyone had ever seen."
The reduction in the number of SEAWOLF units and a realignment of Submarine R&D
responsibility within NAVSEA caused the R&D funds for this equipment to run short and
severely curtailed any further efforts to bring the drawings up the standard. The drawings
were sacrificed in order to produce the hardware, the working prototype. Both fixing the
drawings and making the prototype work could not be done with existing funds.
Therefore, two contracts were let to Contractor H. The first to refurbish the prototype in
order to install it on SEAWOLF (SSN21). The second contract was to bring the design
drawings in line with the refurbished prototype. A bid was requested from Contractor H
to fix the drawings. Two bids were submitted, one to "fix the drawings right" and the
other to "make them better than they were" (an approximate 60 percent fix). Again the
lower bid was accepted, and the drawings were somewhat improved. The prevailing
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attitude at the time in NAVSEA was that the quality of the drawings wasn't of great
concern because everyone expected Contractor H (the developer) to win the competitive
bid. Contractor H's past track record on bids for other equipment that it produced for the
Navy suggested it would undercut its competition significantly.
The researcher was not able to determine the original cost of the design
data for this equipment. The cost data are embedded throughout the R&D contract. The
contract to upgrade the drawings was awarded at $1.12 million. This was about 50-70
percent ofwhat it would have taken to produce accurate Level III design data. A worse
case estimate is that it would have cost $2.25 million to produced complete Level IQ
design data.
The reason cited for purchasing the design data for the equipment was that
it was NAVSEA' s intention to compete the production contract because of the number of
units to be purchased. NAVSEA planned not only to outfit all 29 SEAWOLF submarines
with this equipment, but also to backfit the new equipment on the older classes of
submarines that had the old equipment manufactured by Contractor T. Problems with the
demand for this equipment began to develop shortly thereafter. The decision was made to
not backfit the older classes of submarines with the new equipment. This decision was
due in part to the longer-than-anticipated development period as well as the start ofthe
downsizing of the submarine force. Although not specifically part of the SEAWOLF
Program, but as equipment that was planned to be installed on SEAWOLF, the demand
for the equipment also fell prey to the instability in the SEAWOLF Program.
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NAVSEA's initial acquisition strategy for this new atmosphere control
equipment was that, after the prototype was built, there would be a production prove out
where a sole-source contract would be awarded for a limited number of pieces of
equipment to Contractor H in order to verify that the design could be "built to print."
After the production prove out, the large buy would be awarded by competitive bid. The
turn of events with respect to number of units to be purchased resulted in a drastic change
in the procurement strategy. The competitive bid strategy for the large buy was canceled.
The new strategy became to contract sole-source for the production prove out to obtain
the significantly reduced quantity of units (i.e., three).
One reason it was thought better to go sole-source was that it was believed
that the lead-time would be approximately twelve months longer if a contractor other than
the designer/prototype builder built the follow-on units. The lead time needed for a new
manufacturer was thought to be pushing the deadline for delivery for installation on
SEAWOLF. Contractor H had been asked to submit a sole-source price quote for one
unit. Contractor H's price quote was $8 million. When asked to reconsider and resubmit,
Contractor H again submitted a quote of $8 million. Unfortunately, politics also played a
larger role than anticipated in this acquisition process. Contractor T's strong lobbying
efforts succeeded in exerting enough pressure that the decision was made to compete the
production phase instead of contracting sole-source. Competitive bids were solicited. The
contract called for production oftwo units with an option for a third. Only two
contractors submitted bids, Contractor T and Contractor H. The bids were very similar.
Contractor H's bid was $5.4 million per unit while Contractor T's bid was approximately
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$250,000 less at $5.15 million ($10.3 million for two units with an option for a third).
NAVSEA believed the price difference from the sole-source quote and the competitive
quote was partially due to competition and partially due to the multiple unit buy.
NAVSEA accepted the low bid, Contractor T. The option was eventually exercised for
the third unit at a price of $4.9 million.
The partial fix of the known bad design drawings and the subsequent award
of the follow-on production contract to the designer's competitor without production
prove out has resulted in over 930 Engineering Change Proposals (ECP) being submitted
by Contractor T. Over 95 percent of these ECPs have been a result of errors or omissions
on the design drawings. This has caused at least 20 contract modifications at a cost to the
government of over $3.5 million. Additionally, it caused approximately a two-year delay
in delivery of the equipment and a $1.3 million Request for Equitable Adjustment (REA)
from Contractor T. The Navy even modified the contract to provide more than $700,000
in Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) to prevent further schedule delays. The
unusually high number of changes effectively turned this fixed price contract into a cost
reimbursement contract.
One interviewee cited the early initiation of configuration management as a
contributing factor in the case. The review and approval process started far too early in
the design process, and contributed to the delays experienced by this program.
Cost analysis was not done at the time to determine whether obtaining the
design data was cost effective. The prevailing attitude was that sole-source was "bad" and
that everything should be competed.
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d. Case Analysis: Atmosphere Control Equipmentfor the
SEAWOLF
The case presented above provides an opportunity to analyze the factors to
consider when procuring design data. The following observations were made from review
of the events, intentions, and outcomes of the case.
(1) Attempting to transfer unproven design data from one
contractor to another cost NAVSEA an additional $5.9 million and a two-year delay on an
original contract for $10.3 million.
(2) No documented attempt to measure the costs of the design
data of the equipment could be found.
(3) No documented cost/benefit analysis performed during this
contract was identified.
(4) There is a need to prove or test the design data as a
product.
(5) The quality of design data can suffer if configuration
management is initiated too early in the design process.
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(6) World events can change defense policy quickly, requiring
dramatic changes in acquisition strategies even after the process has begun.
B. NEED/MARKET ANALYSIS
The answer to the question "Is there a need for the application of this technology
to the Navy Inventory System?" must be answered in two parts. The first part answers
the question "Is there money to be saved?" while the second part answers the question
"Are there parts that can be designated for CIM/RAMP manufacture that could save
money?" The Department ofDefense Budget and Navy Inventory valuation and
maintenance cost figures discussed in Chapter III are summarized below and provided as
data to answer the first part of the question.
Summary of Chapter HI Data - Potential for Savings
1998 Federal Budget $1.69 trillion
1998 Defense Budget $260 billion
QDR Defense Budget Assumption $250 billion/yr thru 2015 (1997 dollars)
DOD Inventory value 1996 $67 billion (1995 dollars)
Navy Inventory Value 1996 $33.7 billion (1995 dollars)
DOD Inventory Maintenance Costs 1 995 $24 billion (1995 dollars)
Table 5.1. Summary of Chapter III Data - Potential for Savings
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An analysis to determine potential CIM/RAMP candidate parts was performed to
answer the second part of the question.
1. CIM/RAMP Candidate Part Analysis
In order to establish whether buying design data up front to support CIM/RAMP
manufacture ofNew Attack Submarine parts at a later date is cost effective, there is a
need to establish the number of candidate parts that can be CIM/RAMP manufactured.
Time, scope, data availability, and security classification constraints limited the analysis to
one system or subsystem of the New Attack Submarine. There are approximately 250
such subsystems that comprise the New Attack Submarine (Interview-B, 1997).
In order to properly evaluate a system, criteria were established in order to select a
potential system. The first criterion established was that the system had to be unclassified.
This would allow the entire thesis to be unclassified and prevent any handling and
processing restrictions. The second criterion was that it be a submarine unique system.
The purpose of this criterion was to minimize the potential for the system analyzed to have
parts/components with a large population in the Navy supply system. The third criterion
was that it have a cross-section of parts (e.g., valves, pumps, piping, electrical
components, connectors). The purpose of this criterion was to give as representative a
sample of types of parts of the entire population of the New Attack Submarine as possible.
The last criterion was that similar systems exist on previous classes of submarines. The
purpose of this criterion was to have a cross-reference and alternative data collection point
in the event that data for the New Attack Submarine system was not available.
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a. Reelable Towed Array Handling System (RTAHS)
Based on the above criteria, the choice of the system for analysis was the
Towed Array Handling System. This is the system that allows the submarine to stream
and retrieve the towed sonar array. The towed sonar array is part of the acoustic sensor
suite on board the submarine. The handling system has a cross-section of types of
components. They include hydraulics, seawater systems, mechanical cable handling
systems as well as control and indicator circuitry and all associated connectors.
The initial intention was to evaluate a system on the New Attack
Submarine to identify candidate parts for potential CIM/RAMP manufacture. It was
eventually discovered that the system drawings were not fully approved and available for
review. The alternative system selected was the similar system on the SEAWOLF
submarine. This system is known as the Reelable Towed Array Handling System
(RTAHS). During the course of data collection on the SEAWOLF RTAHS, it was
determined that the appropriate documentation and drawings were not available to the
researcher. This caused data collection to proceed to the second alternate research path,
the Reelable Towed Array Handling System (RTAHS) on the LOS ANGELES (688)
Class submarine. A review of available drawings and technical manuals and discussions
with program personnel confirmed that the system designs were very similar. A complete
parts lists was obtained for the LOS ANGELES Class RTAHS. It satisfied the established
criteria and became the subject of the CIM/RAMP candidate parts analysis.
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b. RTAHS Parts Analysis
The RTAHS has 18 major components. Each major component is
comprised of a discrete number of different parts. Some parts appear more than once in
each major component. The range of the number of different parts in each major
component is between 16 and 345. There is a total of 1975 different parts in the RTAHS
system.
The source for each part was provided as a contractor number. A
contractor listing was also provided. The contractor list included 57 contractors4 and
three different sets of military or industry standards. Approximately 95 percent of the
parts that specified a standard as the source for the part were fasteners.
An analysis was conducted to differentiate between parts that were
contractor supplied and those that were in accordance with an established standard. The
significance of this data breakdown is that the parts that specify a contractor as the source
have the potential to have proprietary design data associated with that part. Conversely,
there would be no proprietary data associated with the parts specifying a standard as the
source, because they are manufactured to a government or industry standard. According
to the analysis, ofthe total number of parts, 1055 (53 percent) are contractor supplied,
4 An investigation was conducted into the number of contractors listed who were still in
business. The results, although not directly related to the overall investigation, still proved
interesting. First an Internet search was conducted. For those not located on the Internet, a
telephone directory assistance search was conducted. Of the 57 contractors listed, 49 were
located. The search does not preclude that the company was merged or the name completely
changed, but the results still suggest some degree of instability in the industrial base.
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and 920 (47 percent) are manufactured in accordance with established standards. The
results of this analysis are displayed in Table 5.2.
The second analysis was conducted to determine the number of
CIM/RAMP candidate parts based on the design data available. The parts were classified
into five categories: (1) fasteners, including screws, nuts, bolts, washers, pins, and studs;
(2) small mechanical parts (SMPs) that are CIM/RAMP manufacturable; (3) printed wire
assemblies (PWAs) that are CIM/RAMP manufacturable; (4) non-PWA electrical parts,
including lamps, fuses, microelectronics, and connectors; and (5) other parts, including
gaskets, packing, adhesives, and non-CIM/RAMP manufacturable mechanical parts
including those from molds or casts. The results of this analysis are displayed in
Table 5.3.
The results show that, based on design data alone, 34 1 are CIM/RAMP
manufacturable. The CIM/RAMP manufacturable parts were considered as those
classified as PWAs and SMPs. The fasteners, although CIM/RAMP manufacturable, were
not included in the total because it was assumed that commercial sources of standard
fasteners would likely be available. The 341 CIM/RAMP manufacturable parts equate to
17.3 percent of the parts in the system.
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Reelable Towed Array Handling System Parts Analysis









CABLE DRIVE UNIT 131 63 194
CABLE DRIVE HYD MOTOR 31 31
VALVE STACK ASSBLY 61 15 76
SHEAVE AND CABLE GUIDE 12 4 16
ARRAY FLUSHING AND SNUBBER 37 5 42
HYD CONTROL MANIFOLD 51 51 102
PRESSURE REGULATING VALVE 20 16 36
ON/OFF/BYPASS VALVE 31 12 43
SOLENOID VALVE 48 37 85
CROSS-CONNECT VALVE 16 9 25
CABLE GUIDE/DATA BOX 112 103 215
CABLE STOWAGE/LEVEL WIND 124 52 176
CABLE STOWAGE HYD MOTOR 36 3 39
CABLE STOWAGE HYD BRAKE 18 18
CONT & IND (OK-276A/BQ) 98 247 345
CONT & IND (OK-276()/BQ) 134 199 333
CONT & IND (OK-418/BQ) 79 99 178
DIFF PRESSURE TRANSDUCER 16 5 21
TOTAL 1055 920 1975
Table 5.2. RTAHS Parts Analysis: Contractor vs. Standard as the Source.
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C. NAVY INTEREST IN THE APPLICATION OF INTELLIGENT DIGITAL
DATA
During the course of this research, 34 individuals were interviewed from the
various associated organizations. With the exception of those individuals associated with
the RAMP Program, only two individuals interviewed appeared to have a ready
understanding regarding the concepts of intelligent digital data, the RAMP Program, and
the benefits that the application of this type of technology could provide. The extent of
their understanding was measured by the responses to questions posed by the researcher
during the interviews. Specifically, the researcher asked questions concerning the
application. Then, if necessary, the researcher provided answers in an incremental fashion
in order to measure both an understanding of the technology concept as well as an
understanding of application and its potential costs and benefits. Only those individuals
associated with the RAMP Program thought that the application was one worth pursuing.
Four interviewees were quick to point out a specific instance where the application of this
technology would not work or would not be cost effective.
One interviewee cited the lack of analysis for the application of intelligent digital
data as a reflection of the fact that other initiatives were being explored to achieve the
same end. Outsourcing is one of those methods. There have been discussions concerning
the potential for a consortium of shipbuilders to take over and operate a portion ofthe
Navy/DLA supply system. These discussions were prompted by the fact that DLA's
depot operation cost recovery factors assigned to parts were running "60-70 percent of
the procurement cost of the part" (Interview-B, 1997). The potential for including in
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procurement contracts a requirement that would make the prime contractor responsible
for spare parts for the weapon system in a "just-in-time" delivery scenario has also been
discussed (Interview-B, 1997).
No evidence was discovered that the costs and benefits of the application of
intelligent digital data to reduce the spare and repair parts inventory had ever been
investigated.
D. COSTS OF INTELLIGENT DIGITAL DATA APPLICATION
As mentioned above, no specific cost figures for the procurement of design data
were available from any program investigated. This was largely due to the costs of data
being deeply embedded in the research and development or overall design contracts
(Interview-A, 1997; Interview-C, 1997). No metrics were established or entered in the
contract at the time of award to enable tracking or reconstruction of this cost data
(Interview-A, 1997). Appendix B details the data that was not available during the course
of the research.
The cost data that are available are peripheral to that of design data. Recall the
processing cost per contractor drawing for the design contractor for the SEAWOLF
Submarine was approximately $5,000 (Interview-A, 1997). The average cost per printed
wire assembly to convert hardcopy design data to intelligent digital data is $1,500
(Interview-T, 1997). The cost per part to reverse engineer a printed wire assembly was
stated to be part dependent but in all cases higher than the $1,500 average data conversion
cost (Interview-T, 1997).
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In the absence of specifically documented costs for design data, an alternate
method was considered to estimate the value of intelligent digital data. This method
involved a spreadsheet-based model to estimate the expected value of the intelligent digital
data from the customer's perspective. What would the New Attack Submarine class as an
aggregate be willing to pay up front in order to save money over the life cycle of the
submarine class. This model is in concert with the purpose of the application of intelligent
digital data to reduce the spare and repair parts inventory: make the up-front investment
to save money in the long-run.
The function of the model is to calculate a net present value for the difference in
the cost of parts procurement between the use of intelligent digital data and existing spare
and repair parts inventory procedures. It is an estimation of the net present value of the
savings that would result from not stocking the part but not from the cost of the part itself.
The annual savings will be considered to be the holding costs. Based on previous analysis
(Ahern, 1991), 33 percent of the DLA surcharge is considered as a proxy for accrued
holding costs. As previously discussed in Chapter III, the surcharge levied on parts by the
supply system varies from fiscal year to fiscal year. The net present value generated by the
model would then constitute the upper bound ofwhat the Navy should pay for intelligent
digital data for a specific part. This is the upper bound because it equates to the break-
even point. If the Navy paid more than this price and if all assumptions and variables'
values were valid, the Navy would not recoup the investment over the life cycle of the
program. Additionally, this net present value also represents a conservative estimate of
the cost savings from this initiative. The net present value represents just the potential
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savings in holding costs. It does not take into account the reductions possible in the total
inventory as a consequence of the short production lead time as well as contract
administrative lead time associated with CEVI/RAMP parts.
1. Present Value Model
The present value model was constructed using the Lotus 1-2-3 Spreadsheet
application. Based on the characteristics and availability of input data, a Monte Carlo
simulation could be performed using this same spreadsheet model and the Crystal Ball
add-in program. For this analysis, the nature of the input data negated the additional
benefits that the Monte Carlo simulation could provide. Therefore, the basic spreadsheet
net present value model was used. The model calculates the net present value of the
difference in purchasing and using intelligent digital data to manufacture inventory when
required in lieu of procuring and holding inventory to meet the forecast demand. As
mentioned above, the basic function of the model is to calculate a net present value for the
differences in the cost of parts procurement between the use of intelligent digital data and
existing spare and repair parts inventory procedures. The model and its description are
provided as Appendix C.
2. Model Results
The analysis was conducted by altering the three part-specific variables while
maintaining all other assumptions and variables constant. The three variables, unit price,
failure rate and population per platform, were each changed one at a time. The surcharge
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rate although expected to vary from year-to-year was assumed to constant over the life
cycle of the program and was assigned as the average of the values from FY-91 to FY-98.
The development of the surcharge rate is discussed in more detail in Appendix C.
The analysis was conducted using the three part-specific variables with five point
estimate values used for each. The analysis resulted in 125 net present value figures.
These figures represent the various combinations of part specific variables. The results of
the model are presented in Tables C. 1 through C.5. Each table represents the
combinations of failure rate and population per platform for a specific unit price.
The unit price of parts with submarine application that are CEVI/RAMP
manufacturable was believed to range from $1.00 to $90,000.00, with the bulk ofthese
parts in the $2,000.00 to $12,000.00 range (Interview-AJ, 1997). Three intermediate
point estimates of unit price were also used, $10,000.00, $1000.00, and $10.00.
The annual failure rates range from four per year to zero. Five conservative point
estimates for annual failure rate were selected. Point estimates of 4.0, 1.0, 0.2, 0.1 and
0.033 were used. These failure rates represent four failures per year (or one per quarter),
one failure per year, one failure every five years, one failure every ten years and one failure
in 30 years.
Population per platform for CIM/RAMP manufacturable parts range from one to
40. The five values used for population per platform were 1.0, 2.0, 5.0, 20.0 and 40.0.
Table C. 1 represents the combinations of failure rate and population per platform
for the upper bound unit price of $90,000.00. Table C.2 represents the combinations of
failure rate and population per platform for a unit price of $10,000.00. Table C.3
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represents the combinations of failure rate and population per platform for a unit price of
$1,000.00. Table C.4 represents the combinations of failure rate and population per
platform for a unit price of $10.00. Table C.5 represents the combinations of failure rate
and population per platform for the lower bound unit price of $1 .00.
The net present value ranged from $1 (Table C.5) to $503 million (Table C. 1).
The $1 value represents the most that the Navy should pay for the intelligent digital data
for a part that is at the lower bound in terms of unit price, population per platform and
failure rate. Conversely, for a part at the upper bound in terms of unit price, population
per platform and failure rate, $503 million is the most the Navy should pay. These figures
bound the possible.
The other representative point estimate combinations suggest more likely results.
The representative point estimate tables (C.2 through C.4) provide a range of $70 to
$7 million. These figures also represent a conservative estimate of the potential savings to
be experienced by the application of intelligent digital data.
Ifthe the results of the net present value estimation model are used along with the
CIM/RAMP candidate parts analysis, a conservative estimate of the potential savings of
using intelligent digital data to reduce the spare and repair parts inventory for the New
Attack Submarine can be obtained. Recall that 17.3 percent of the parts contained in the
Reelable Towed Array Handling System (RTAHS) were candidates for CIM/RAMP
manufacturing. For the purposes of this analysis we will assume that the 17.3 percent is
an average of the percentages ofCIM/RAMP manufacturable parts in each system in the
New Attack Submarine.
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Recall that the RTAHS is one of 250 such systems on the New Attack Submarine.
Since these are all complex systems, we will assume that each contains at least as many
parts as the RTAHS; namely 1975 parts.
Although the unit price of parts that are CIM/RAMP manufacturable and found on
submarines varies from less than $10.00 to greater than $10,000, suppose we
conservatively assume that every part on the New Attack Submarine has a unit price of
$10. In addition, suppose averages were used of the resulting combinations of failure rate
and population per platform. The average of the values in Table C.4 is $5,070 and would
then represent the net present value of the conservative estimate of potential cost savings
for each part. With these conservative assumptions the following calculations were made
to determine the potential value ofthe expected life cycle cost savings for the New Attack
Submarine:
Life Cycle = (1975 parts/system) x (17.3% of parts) x (250 systems) x ($5,070)
Cost Savings
= $433 million.
The results of this present value analysis indicate an expected savings in holding
costs of $433 million for the population ofCIM/RAMP manufacturable parts at an
average unit price of $10. This value represents a conservative estimate for the savings of
holding costs. As the mix of parts is changed to include parts with a unit price of $100,
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$1,000 or $10,000 the savings will increase proportionately. Finally and possibly of
greater importance is that the savings figure does not include the reduction in the total
value of the inventory because of the reduction in number of parts held as a consequence
of the short production lead time associated with CDvl/RAMP parts.
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS
This analysis of the costs and benefits of using intelligent digital data to reduce the
spare and repair parts inventory for the New Attack Submarine (NSSN) focused on four
elements of the basic question. These elements include: (1) the feasibility of such an
application; (2) the need or market for such an application; (3) the Navy's level of
interest in such an application; and (4) the costs of the application.
The exploration of the feasibility element included a determination of whether the
technology existed to procure design data for the New Attack Submarine in intelligent
digital format and then to ascertain whether a vehicle exists to manufacture parts through
the use of the intelligent digital data. The discussion in Chapter IV described the
methodology used in this investigation. The discussion in Chapter II and the data
presented in Chapter V provided a comprehensive overview of both the New Attack
Submarine Program history as well as an overview ofthe Navy's RAMP Program in
addressing this element. The need/market element was addressed by both the discussion
in Chapter III of the implications for the Navy/DLA supply system as well as the data
presented in Chapter V. The level ofNavy interest element was addressed in the results of
the interview data as well as the design data procurement history presented in Chapter V.
The final element concerning the costs of such an application was addressed both in the
Chapter HI discussion of implications for Navy supply support as well as in the discussion
of the data in Chapter V.
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The remainder of this chapter presents the conclusions drawn and the
recommendations generated from the attempt to conduct an analysis of the costs of using
intelligent digital data to reduce the spare and repair parts inventory for the New Attack
Submarine. The discussion includes conclusions drawn concerning the technical
feasibility of such an application, the need or market for such an application, a measure of
the Navy's interest in such an application, and the costs associated with such an
application. Recommendations are made concerning future cost/benefit analyses and
methods to improve data identification and analysis.
B. CONCLUSIONS
1. Proven Technology
Virtual is a term used in the computer science field to describe the use of
computers and digital technology to replicate "in effect or essence though not in actual
fact, form or name" (Webster, 1996). The technology to exploit the use of intelligent
digital data to reduce the spare and repair parts inventory is real. These capabilities would
render a percentage ofthe Navy/DLA parts inventory as "virtual". These capabilities exist
within the Navy and within the defense industrial base. It is the inventory that would exist
in effect though not in actual form until required.
The technology of applying intelligent digital data to reduce the spare and repair
parts inventory has been proven by the Navy's RAMP Program. This program has taken
intelligent digital data for required parts and manufactured those parts in a timely and cost-
effective manner. The RAMP Program developers assumed adequate technical data were
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available on spare parts to be able to create a parts specification data base. Not only did
this assumption prove false, the lack of accurate design data for the required parts persists.
However, with some analysis and forethought, this problem can be avoided for current
and future weapon systems under procurement.
The design, manufacture, and support of systems have become more closely
related. The CATIA CAD/CAM application and associated database is just one example.
CATIA is not just a shipbuilding CAD/CAM application. It has been used by Boeing
Corporation in its design and manufacture of the Boeing 777 Aircraft, and on a smaller
scale by at least one Formula One racing team (IBM/Dassault, 1997;. CATIA has
demonstrated the technical capability to provide intelligent digital data.
Using the relationship between design, manufacture, and support is one potential
means to obtain more efficient and effective logistic support. It is possible that "virtual"
inventory may provide the best balance between cost-effectiveness and timely response.
2. A Market Exists for the Application
There is a market for the application of intelligent digital data to the spare and
repair parts inventory for the New Attack Submarine. The need to procure limited
quantities of the expensive, no-longer-available parts that fostered the genesis ofthe
RAMP Program is the same need that the Navy should be seeking to satisfy by pursuing
the application of intelligent digital data to the Navy's inventory in general and,
specifically, to the New Attack Submarine. The United States Air Force's next-generation
air superiority fighter aircraft, the F-22, has just made its first flight but is already on the
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verge of carrying out-of-production parts. This situation has already cost the Air Force
$76 million in aircraft redesign and obsolete parts procurement. (Evers, 1997)
The primary consideration in the decision to acquire design data has been whether
or not further production will be conducted using competitive bids. Future logistic
support has not been a major consideration in the acquisition decisions concerning design
data. Historical data concerning program life cycle costs indicate that two-thirds of the
life cycle cost of a weapon system are a result of operations and maintenance costs (Walls,
1997). These data suggest that logistic support should be a consideration when weighing
the decision to acquire design data.
The stability of the industrial base is another factor that must be considered when
analyzing the market for this application. The defense industrial base has changed
dramatically in the past decade. Mergers, acquisitions, and overall consolidation have
been the trend in the defense industry since the end of the Cold War.
As a consequence of the industrial base instability, companies which currently
constitute the defense related industrial base may at some future time merge, be acquired,
go out of business, or change their business focus to other than defense related products.
The end result is the company that makes Widget A for System X may not be around in
the year 2008 or 2018 to make a replacement Widget A. This is a void intelligent digital
data can fill. By taking steps during the design and initial production of a weapon system
to include intelligent digital data as a future source of spare parts, the resulting logistic
support over the long term can be more responsive and less expensive.
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The analysis conducted in Chapter V suggests that there does exist a population of
parts in the New Attack Submarine that are candidates for manufacturing in an intelligent
digital data environment. The analysis was conducted on one of the approximately 250
systems which comprise the New Attack Submarine. The analysis indicates that
17.3 percent of the parts listed for that system are candidates for manufacturing using
intelligent digital data. This population includes both mechanical parts and printed wire
assemblies. By combining the CIM/RAMP candidate parts analysis with the intelligent
digital data value model, a conservative estimate of potential savings of $503 million was
obtained for a population of $10 parts over the life ofthe New Attack Submarine class.
The more expensive the population of parts the greater the savings. This analysis only
accounts for the savings in holding costs. It does not account for the savings to be
realized in the reduction in physical inventory. Recall, however, that the Navy's 1996
inventory value was estimated to be $33.7 billion (GAO/NSIAD-97-47) and that the
DOD's annual inventory maintenance costs were running approximately 33 percent of the
inventory value in 1995. These figures are large enough that even a small percentage
reduction in inventory would result in significant savings as capital is no longer required to
be invested in inventory and the lower inventory levels will reduce the overall maintenance
costs of the inventory.
Intelligent digital data are not being procured for the New Attack Submarine. As
stated in Chapter V, only Level II design data are being procured. Level II design data are
not suitable for CIM/RAMP manufacturing. The Level III design data that might be
available have been purchased for previous classes of submarines for equipment also
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installed in the New Attack Class. These data would require conversion to intelligent
digital format.
3. Navy Interest in the Application of Intelligent Digital Data
The data gathered for this thesis indicate that submarine program personnel are not
actively pursuing the application of intelligent digital data to the spare and repair parts
inventory. There are at least eight reasons why this lack of interest persists.
a. There is limited knowledge of the technology and its potential for
application. Of the 20 individuals interviewed outside the RAMP Program 18
demonstrated a lack of understanding or a misunderstanding ofthe benefits that intelligent
digital data provide. The individuals interviewed either had no knowledge of intelligent
digital data, the RAMP Program, or their understanding of the purpose of each was in
error.
b. "Economic reality" is a factor in the interest shown to this
application. Design data have the potential to be costly (Interview-B, 1997). This
application requires an up-front investment for a long-run payoff. The investment is made
early in the system life cycle to realize savings years into the life cycle. Consider the
example of the New Attack Submarine. The contract to procure the lead ship of the New
Attack Class is to be signed in FY-98. If the data acquisition strategy was changed to
selectively acquire intelligent digital data, then funds would be earmarked for acquisition
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of design data with each platform procured. Recall, the lead ship is scheduled to begin
construction in FY-98 with additional hulls planned for procurement in FY-99, FY-01, and
FY-02. Lead ship delivery in FY-04 and attainment of initial operational capability in FY-
06 would begin the recoupment of the investment by realizing savings in the cost of repair
parts. The investment would continue as each new hull is procured (approximately one
hull per year) until the desired amount of design data is procured. The potential for
accruing savings is increased each time another hull is delivered. It is unlikely, however,
that substantial savings will be realized immediately, but rather would accrue over time.
c. The savings are realized in different "pots" ofmoney than the one
from which the investment originated. Additionally, the savings are realized by different
organizations than the one which made the investment, with a time disparity ofup to 50
years. This 50-year span is from the time the first hull enters service until the time the last
hull leaves service. There is no apparent immediate reward to provide an incentive for one
organization to save money for another organization. For example, for the New Attack
Submarine, the funding for the acquisition ofthe design data if pursued would originate in
the research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) and shipbuilding and conversion
Navy (SCN) appropriation accounts of the program office beginning in FY-98. The
savings would be realized in the operations and maintenance Navy (O&MN) appropriation
accounts of the major operational commands sometime after FY-06. The question
becomes, who should be the watchdog? Should it be the Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
Financial Management and Comptroller (ASN(FM&C))? It can be argued that because
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this application involves the weapon system acquisition community and sponsors, the
logistics community, and the financial management community both at the ASN level as
well as the fleet level, they should all be involved in the decision-making and oversight
process.
d. Automation in general is a job-threatening technology . There are
few incentives for someone in a threatened position to embrace a technology that could
cause that same person to look for new employment. A "virtual" inventory would not
demand the same level or type of maintenance that an actual inventory would demand.
This would be especially true in the procurement area of supply support. One of the
benefits that intelligent digital data provide is a reduced procurement lead time. The
administrative lead time for obtaining a contract with a contractor is part of this time.
That time can be expected to be significantly reduced as this process becomes more
automated. It can, therefore, be assumed that some jobs in the procurement area of
supply support might be threatened. The tradeoff of saving money for the organization
versus reduced potential for continued employment in that organization is a difficult one,
and one which appears to contribute to the Navy's lack of interest in applying intelligent
digital data to reduce spare and repair parts inventories.
e. No attempt to quantify a cost/benefit analysis of such an
application, even on a small scale has been identified. With the exception of anecdotal
data, no cost figures for design data were discovered. The cost of design data is crucial to
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any cos^enefit analysis conducted. Without quantified costs and benefits to debate, there
is limited opportunity to generate interest.
f. There are other methods to achieve the same end. Outsourcing is
one of those methods. There have been discussions concerning the potential for a
consortium of shipbuilders to take over and operate portions of the Navy supply system.
These discussions were prompted by the fact that DLA's depot operation cost recovery
factors assigned to parts were "running 60-70 percent of the procurement cost of the part"
(Interview-B, 1997). The potential for including in procurement contracts a requirement
that would make the prime contractor responsible for spare parts for the weapon system in
a "just-in-time" delivery scenario has also been discussed (Interview-B, 1997).
g. It is easier to identify parts that definitely cannot be CIM/RAMP
manufactured than those that can. During the interview process, there was more effort
expended by the interviewees in pointing out particular components that could not be
participants than in analyzing for those that could. At least three interviewees pointed out
examples of components that would not be well suited for the application of intelligent
digital data. Submarine components that have special sound-quieting standards were
mentioned on at least two occasions. (Interview-B, 1997; Interview-F, 1997).
h. Identification of those parts that can be manufactured using
CIM/RAMP technology is a difficult task. It requires more than just analyzing lists of
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stock codes. A 1988 study performed by a contractor for NAVSUP investigated whether
there was standard nomenclature or data which could identify parts as candidates for the
RAMP Program and therefore establish a database for both the NAVICP RAMP liaison
personnel and the inventory managers. No easy method could be found purely from stock
number and nomenclature. A review of over 87,000 parts identified that only 0.6 percent
could be determined to fit into the RAMP technology using just the stock number and part
nomenclature (Peterson, 1993).
The analysis documented in Chapter V required screening of part lists to
eliminate obvious non-candidate parts and reference to at least Level II design data to
establish a candidate list. There is no method for identifying these parts initially or
retrospectively from established engineering or logistics codes or numbering systems. In
the absence of design data, the determination ofwhether the part is CIM/RAMP
manufacturable must be made by the physical examination of the part by manufacturing
technicians familiar with the process. However, physical inspection is not always possible.
Additionally, ifthe design data are not available, then the part must be reverse engineered
to obtain it. The reverse engineering process increases both cost and procurement lead
time for the part.
4. Costs
The key component to evaluation of the cost of applying intelligent digital data to
reduce the spare and repair parts inventory is the cost of the design data in digital format.
The key component of that cost is the cost of the design rights. Design-data-rights cost
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data were not available. The other components, although unavailable in this analysis,
could with proper access be determined. These other components are cost of processing
the design data and producing it in intelligent digital format, as well as maintaining the
cost of the database of design data. Although design data have been obtained in the past,
the necessary metrics for calculating costs have never been included in the contracts which
required the furnishing of design data as an end product. These costs remain imbedded in
the contracts and are not identifiable as attributable costs.
The desired design data costs could be prohibitive. This would be due to the
proprietary nature of the data within industry and the unwillingness of the industry leader
to forfeit without appropriate compensation the "edge" which it holds over its
competitors. Another reason for the cost prohibitive nature of the data is that the data can
be used as a hedge against the volatile nature of large dollar value defense program
contracts. The drastic reductions in the SEAWOLF Program were discussed in Chapter
II. An example of a cancellation of a major weapons acquisition program is the Navy's A-
12 Attack Aircraft. This program was approved in 1984 with a full-scale development
contract signed in 1988 for approximately $4 billion. The A- 12 program was subsequently
canceled in 1991 without the production of a single airframe (DSMC, 1996). These
program changes have made contractors very wary of being left "holding the bag" for the
program startup costs with little hope of accruing future profits. It is exactly these
experiences that cause the price tags assigned to design data in new programs to be
significantly "marked up". This is done as a hedge against program cancellation and to
assure a future income stream.
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The net present value model for estimating the value of intelligent digital data
presented in Chapter V and Appendix C provides a reasonable estimate for this purpose.
A second method to estimate the value of the data could also be used. This method would
involve estimating the cost of reverse engineering the part. Simply, the Navy should pay
no more for intelligent digital data for a part than it would cost the Navy to reverse
engineer the part to obtain intelligent digital data using existing RAMP technology. The
cost of reverse engineering the part has two major variables, complexity and
documentation available. A proposed method for reverse engineering cost estimation is
provided as Appendix D.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . Develop a method for more easily identifying parts that can be
manufactured in an intelligent digital data environment and provide a method for
identifying the parts for which the design data have been obtained in intelligent digital
format.
2. Conduct cost/benefit analyses of applying intelligent digital data to reduce
inventory requirements for all new weapon systems under procurement. The analysis
should determine the parts which are manufacturable in an intelligent digital data
environment. The analysis should also examine demand characteristics for the
manufacturable parts. The cost of the design data should be investigated. Rather than
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inquiring about all the design data or even entire systems, the investigation should focus
on parts that can be manufactured. Additionally, estimates should be obtained to gauge
the cost of manufacturing the parts when needed. These cost data should be compared to
the cost data for maintaining the inventory in the absence of intelligent digital data. Using
the demand characteristics for these parts, a cost difference analysis similar to that
conducted for wholesale inventory stocking should be performed. The analysis would
indicate which parts should continue to be stocked, which parts should not be stocked but
dedicated to CIM/RAMP manufacturing, and which parts should not be stocked or
dedicated to CIM/RAMP manufacturing. Selective purchasing of design data may prove
to be the most cost-effective method. The evaluation would represent a net present value
analysis of the expected future savings in inventory maintenance costs versus the design
data procurement costs and the costs of manufacturing parts when needed.
3. The process of procuring intelligent digital data should include procedures
for validation of the data as complete and accurate. This should be done regardless of
whether the data are intended for future new systems procurement competition or for
logistic support of existing systems. Consideration should be given to incorporating a
provision for technical assistance from the developer should problems arise during the
attempted use of the design data.
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4. The RAMP Program should prepare a method for estimating the cost of
reverse engineering parts. The method should expand on the basic structure provided as
Appendix D.
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APPENDIX A. TRANSITION TO DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3015 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20301-301B
ACOUrWTlOW ANO JJN A IQqp
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMEN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
DIRECTORS. DEFENSE AGENCIES
SUBJECT: Acquisition of Information in Digital Format
The acquisition of data in digital format offers numerous
benefits to the Department, most which translate directly into
cost savings. To take full advantage of these benefits, I ask
you to ensure your existing contracts are reviewed for data
delivery format and, where non-digital formats axe specified,
that you modify your contracts to require digital format when it
is mission-effective and cost-effective to do so.
Many existing contracts pre-date digital requirements and
specify data delivery on paper, aperture cards, and microfiche.
More often than not, these may be changed to digital format with
no loss in customer suitability and security, and with all of the
accompanying gain in supportability and cost savings . Naturally,
changes to digital format must be compatible with Government
information processing systems, but contractor data systems and
formats should be used whenever they satisfy program needs.
I realize many agencies have already begun moving in this
direction, but to gain speed and consistency I believe we should
pursue a more formal effort. Please communicate this to your
program managers and contracting officers. Monitor their
progress and give them your enthusiastic support this is a good
source of savings and efficiency.
4Ut
R.N04
Figure A. 1 . Principal Deputy Under Secretary ofDefense (Acquisition and Technology)
Memorandum
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UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1 10O DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON. DC 20301-1 lOO
COMPTROtXO* MAY 2 1 1997
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OFTHE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OFTHE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OFTHE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACIlVlTUsS
SUBJECT: Management Reform Memorandum #2 - Moving to a Paper-free Contracting
Process by January 1, 2000
The Secretary ofDefense has directed that we undertake a revolution in business practices in
conjunction with the Quadrennial Defense Review. He has specifically cited the need to simplify
and modernize our acquisition process in the area of contract writing, administration,
finance, and auditing.
In order to determine the feasibility of sweeping changes in this area, I am requesting the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) to develop, by July 1 , the blueprint of a
plan to move to a totally paper-free contract writing, administration, finance, and auditing
process. This plan should be coordinated with all of the organizations that participate in the
integrated process. The plan should incorporate the Department's ongoing initiatives for use of
purchase cards, electronic catalogues, electronic commerce and imaging.
I request your full cooperation in developing this blueprint.
In approximately two weeks from the date of this memorandum, I will have my secretary
arrange for a meeting with the USD(A&T) to obtain a status on how this effort is proceeding.
cc: Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Figure A.2. Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Memorandum
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UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON. DC 20301-1 JOO
JUL ZS 85/
MEMORANDUM FORUNDER SECRETARIES OP DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCHAND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
GENERAL COUNSEL OFTHE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OFTHEDEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR. OPERATIONALTEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OFTHE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OFTHE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES
INFO COPY: SECRETARIES OFTHE MDLTTARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUBJECT: Addendum to Management Fxforrn Memorandum #2 - Moving to a Paper- free
Contracting Process by January 1, 2000
Management Reform Memorandum #2 cited the need to simplify and modernize our
acquisition process in the area of contract writing, ldminiBtrBtion, finance and auditing.
After further review, it baa been determined that in order to achieve successful
implementation in this area, the logistics community needs to be included in this effort.
Therefore, through this addendum. I am now asking that a plan be developed to move to a totally
paper-free acquisition process.
The paper-free acquisition process coincides with the Department's corporate goal of digital
operations for acquisition management and life cycle integrated information. The paper-free plan,
will define a process whereby electronic information can be managed, accessed, and shared by all
users.
Figure A3. Addendum to Under Secretary ofDefense (Comptroller) Memorandum
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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-1000
JUL z 1397
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
DIRECTORS, DEFENSE AGENCIES
SUBJECT: Policy for the Transition to a Digital Environment for
Acquisition Programs
The Department has made substantial progress in the
acquisition, management, and use of digitized information. It is
now time to move forward to a fully digital environment in all
acquisition program and support offices. Industry has already
demonstrated that this is not only possible, but preferable to
traditional paper-driven systems. I am setting a corporate goal of
digital operations being the method of choice for all acquisition
management and life cycle support information. By the end of 2002,
the overwhelming majority of DoD acquisition and logistics
operations should be based on digital methodologies and products.
The focus of this effort must be at the program office level.
Consistent with the architecture established by the joint DoD level
executive steering group, Program Managers shall be responsible for
establishing a data management system and appropriate digital
environment that allows every activity involved with the program
throughout its total life-cycle to exchange data digitally.
I am counting on your support for this critical initiative
that will enhance acquisition reform, further empower our
Integrated Product Teams, and combine with electronic commerce to
achieve greater efficiencies in the weapon system life cycle.
Figure A.4. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum
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THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20301-3010
JUL I 5 1997
ACQUISITION AND
TECHNOLOGY
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
ASSISTANT SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
DIRECTORS, DEFENSE AGENCIES
SUBJECT: Guidance for the Transition to a Digital Environment for
Acquisition Programs
In his July 2, 1997 memorandum entitled "Policy for the
Transition to a Digital Environment for Acquisition Programs," the
Deputy Secretary of Defense set a corporate goal of digital
operations being the method of choice across our community by the
end of 2002. He further stated that the overwhelming majority of
DoD acquisition and logistics operations are expected to be based
on digital methodologies and products by that time. I strongly
support the Deputy Secretary of Defense in this critical
initiative.
To enable the smooth implementation of the Secretary's policy,
the Director, Acquisition Program Integration, shall augment the
Integrated Program Management Initiative Executive Steering Group
(IPMI ESG) with representatives experienced in implementing a
digital environment. As a minimum, the Service Acquisition
Executives, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence, and Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Logistics will be represented. The ESG will coordinate
cross Component activities, develop any additional guidance deemed
necessary for achieving digital program office operations and
report progress, to the Defense Systems Affordability Council.
Attachment (1) provides the additional implementation guidance







Acting Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition and Technology)
Figure A. 5. Under Secretary ofDefense (Acquisition and Technology) Memorandum
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TRANSITION GUIDANCE
ACQUISITION PROGRAMS DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT
In order to achieve a digital environment in acquisition programs,
the following specific guidance is provided:
a. The Executive Steering Group shall report progress to the
USD(A&T) every six months. The first progress report shall include
a Plan of Action and Milestones for this initiative.
b. Each component shall provide budgetary and technical support to
their program managers to attain an acquisition program digital
environment
.
c. The Components and Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC)
shall encourage contractors to submit concept papers under the
single process initiative (SPI) to promote and define the digital
environment and reduce the opportunity for the development of sub-
optimized solutions by each program office.
d. The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) shall ensure that,
beginning in FY 98, program management training courses include in
their curriculum guidance on the practical implementation of the
digital environment.
e. All new programs will include digital operations in their
strategy planning. All existing programs shall complete a
feasibility and cost assessment of moving to digital operations as
soon as possible. This requirement will be reflected in
appropriate Component budgets.
f. The feasibility and cost assessments for ACAT I programs will
be completed in sufficient time to support budgeting no later than
the FYOO POM.
g. The data formats of independent standards-setting organizations
shall take precedence over all other formats. The issue of data
formats and transaction sets shall be independent of the method of
access or delivery of the data.
h. Existing infrastructure shall be used in implementing /che
digital environment to the maximum extent practicable.
i. Milestone Decision Authorities shall assess the digital
environment developed for each acquisition program as required by
DepSecDef policy.
Figure A.6. Attachment to Under Secretary ofDefense (Acquisition and Technology)
Memorandum
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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON. DC 20301-3000
1 7 JUL 1997
ACQUISITION AND
TECHNOLOGY
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION &
TECHNOLOGY)
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS &
INTELLIGENCE)
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(ACQUISITION REFORM)
DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION PROGRAM INTEGRATION
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE PROCUREMENT
DIRECTOR FOR ADMINISTRATION
SUBJECT: Life-Cycle Information Integration
The Secretary of Defense has directed that we undertake
a revolution in business practices in conjunction with the
Quadrennial Defense Review. We have begun this process with
the recent Deputy Secretary of Defense policy to migrate
acquisition and logistics operations to digital
methodologies and products by 2002. Our goal is to
establish an environment that allows every activity involved
with a program throughout its life-cycle to benefit from
integrated information, and electronic data interchange.
The increasing complexities and interdependencies of
acquisition and logistics systems integration requires a
dedicated, synergistic effort to address issues of
information integration, and shared data throughout the
weapon system life cycle. To provide a dedicated and
focused management of these life cycle processes which are
heavily dependent on integrated shared data; I am hereby
consolidating the Continuous Acquisition and Life-Cycle
Support (CALS) , Logistic Business Systems (LBS) and
Electronic Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange (EC/EDI)
offices into a Life-Cycle Information Integration Office
under the leadership of Mr. Mark Adams. Mr. Adams will be
responsible for coordinating personnel realignments, funding
resources, budget issues, contracts, office facility needs
and all other mission requirements.
tU>H
fi' John F. Phillips
Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense (Logistics)
Figure A.7. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics) Memorandum
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APPENDIX B. SUMMARY OF DATA NOT AVAILABLE
Throughout the investigation, a number of data important to the analysis were
determined to be not available. This appendix details data not available and the reason the
data were not available. The purpose of this appendix is provide students conducting
thesis research on similar or follow-on topics with a record ofboth the data obtained as
well as that which was not available.
A. DESIGN DATA COST
1. Data and Significance
No documented cost figures were available from either the New Attack Submarine
Program or the SEAWOLF Program for any specific equipment installed or expected to
be installed on those platforms. The costs are believed to have two major components,
proprietary data rights and data processing costs.
2. Reason not Available
The necessary metrics have not been incorporated in contracts to document these
costs. Although design data has been procured, the specific costs of that design data have
been entwined with multiple line items in research and development contracts and weapon
system procurement contracts.
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B. VALUE OF SPARE AND REPAIR PARTS INVENTORY
1. Data and Significance
Neither the value of the spare and repair parts inventory supporting the submarine
force nor the value of the inventory supporting a specific class of submarine could be
determined. These data would have been useful in determining the potential savings for
intelligent digital application.
2. Reason not Available
These data were not available because NAVICP and DLA don't view inventories
as platform specific for ships. In addition, certain parts have the potential to support a
number of different weapon systems. There does not appear to be a good method of
querying the computer systems, which have the status of the wholesale inventory, to
receive an accurate answer. If a query was initiated using all active submarine Unit
Identification Codes (UICs) this would determine the existing inventory that is submarine
applicable. This answers the question ofwhat is the value of the portion of the wholesale
inventory that has submarine application. The problem arises in that it also includes items
that are also found on other platforms. Trying to apportion how much of each item
supports which weapon system would be a time consuming task and the accuracy of the
results would be questionable.
98
C. REVERSE ENGINEERING COSTS
1. Data and Significance
Reverse engineering cost estimates or examples were not available. The reverse
engineering cost estimates would have been helpful in determining the maximum price to
pay for intelligent digital data. These data could be used in the construction of a model to
estimate the cost of reverse engineering based on the part characteristics as they apply to
the reverse engineering process. Such a model is proposed in Appendix D. Ifthe Navy
can reverse engineer the part and obtain the intelligent digital data for X dollars then X
dollars is the maximum price the Navy should pay for intelligent digital data from the
contractor.
2. Reason not Available
The data were not available from the RAMP Program or RAMP facilities. It is
unclear whether the data were never recorded or whether it was not broken out of the
entire production package cost.
D. SPECIFIC COST SAVINGS EXAMPLES FOR RAMP APPLICATION
1. Data and Significance
Specific cost savings examples for a specific part or series of parts were not
available from the RAMP Program. Some general savings figures were available, but
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most took the form of percentage savings and efficiency increases. There were very few
dollar value examples ofRAMP Program savings potential. These examples are important
in establishing credibility in the program that has been in operation producing parts for
seven years. These data are important on a small scale to gage the magnitude of potential
savings when applied on a larger scale.
2. Reason not Available
The data were not available from the RAMP Program, NAVICP or RAMP
facilities. It was unclear whether the data was not recorded, not broken out of the overall
production package or whether the other option (i.e., contract for procurement with other
than RAMP facility) was not investigated or just did not exist.
E. DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY SURCHARGE RATE
1. Data and Significance
The DLA surcharge rates for consumable items were requested for fiscal years
1990 through 1998. The data were desired to validate several statements by interviewees
on the "cost of doing business with DLA", as well as for use in the spreadsheet-based net
present value model.
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2. Reason not Available
The data were requested from the Defense Logistics Agency. The request was
acknowledged but denied as the data was considered proprietary and not normally
disseminated outside the agency (DLA).
F. SUMMARY
The investigation proved very challenging from the aspect of locating the data
desired to analyze the costs of the application of intelligent digital data. Despite the
qualitative evidence suggesting the application makes good fiscal sense, it proved difficult
to translate into quantitative terms. In discussing this qualitative to quantitative translation
the thesis sponsor related the following point:
Why do you think we ask graduate school thesis students to take on these
thesis topics? If the data were readily available we could do the
cost/benefit analysis ourselves. (Interview-H, 1997)
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APPENDIX C. NET PRESENT VALUE ESTIMATION MODEL
A net present value estimation model was constructed using the Lotus 1-2-3
Spreadsheet Application. Analysis was conducted using the model to calculate the net
present value of the benefits of purchasing intelligent digital data to reduce the spare and
repair parts inventory ofNew Attack Submarine for a variety of parts with varying
characteristics. This valuation process was conducted from the customer's perspective.
What is the most the customer would be willing to pay for the intelligent digital data based
on the forecast savings from not accruing holding costs prior to actually needing the part
over the life cycle of the weapon system?
The basic function of the model is to calculate a net present value for the
differences in the cost of parts procurement to the customer between the use of intelligent
digital data and current spare and repair parts supply procedures. It is an estimation of the
net present value of the savings that would result from not stocking the part. The annual
savings will be considered to be the holding costs (storage, transportation, obsolescence,
loss/damage, and investment costs). For the purposes of this estimation, a percentage of
the surcharge is considered as a proxy for accrued holding costs. As previously discussed
in Chapter in, the surcharge levied on parts by the supply system historically has varied
from fiscal year to fiscal year.
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A. MODEL DEVELOPMENT
The construction and functioning of the net present value model is described in the
following paragraphs. Table C.6 provides an example of the model output for a
$10,000.00 unit price, 20 parts per platform and a failure rate of one per year.
1. Fiscal Year
The fiscal year is used to anchor the model to the New Attack Submarine Program
in terms of a fiscal year calendar. Funding for the first New Attack Submarine is
contained in the Fiscal Year 1998 Defense Appropriations Act. However, The first
submarine will not enter service until FY-04. Costs are assumed to occur at the end ofthe
year.
2. Year
The year is simply the sequential year of the program. Year zero is considered to
be FY-98. This is the fiscal year which the government is about to enter and
coincidentally the fiscal year in which funding for the first New Attack Submarine has been
appropriated. This number is used in the net present value calculation as well as the
inflation calculation.
3. Submarines in Service
The number of submarines in service is calculated by adding together the number
of platforms which have achieved operational capability. The schedule of contract awards
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was obtained from The Integrated Logistics Support Planfor the New Attack Submarine
(PEO SUB-X, 1993) as well as from the FY-98 President's Budget (OMB, 1997). The
first hull is scheduled to be delivered in FY-04 (PEO SUB-X, 1993; OMB, 1997). For the
purposes of the model the first four platforms are assumed to take the same amount of
time to be delivered (six years from contract award) (PEO SUB-X, 1993). The next four
platforms are considered to reach operational capability in five years from contract award
(Moore, 1997). The remaining 22 platforms are considered to reach operational capability
in four years from contract award (Moore, 1997). The class size is programmed to be 30
platforms. Each platform is assumed to have a 30-year life cycle from delivery. Beginning
with the contract awards for hulls nine through 30, the construction rate is expected to
increase to 1 .5 hulls per year. For the purposes of this model it is assumed that two hulls
will be delivered in the odd fiscal years beginning with FY- 13 and one hull will be
delivered in the even fiscal years beginning in FY- 14. This pattern is assumed to continue
to class completion in FY-27.
4. Population per Platform
The basic functioning of the model requires an estimate of the total population of a
part within the New Attack Submarine class. The total population is the number oftimes
the part appears throughout the New Attack Submarine class. In order to estimate the
total parts population a population of the part per platform is needed. The population per
platform is a specific characteristic of the part. The population per platform is the number
of times the part in question appears throughout one hull of the New Attack Submarine.
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The population per platform was a variable in the model that was assigned different values
during different runs of the model.
5. Total Population During the Year
The total population during the year is simply the number of submarines in service
during a year multiplied by the population per platform.
Total Population During the Year = (Submarines in Service During the Year)
x (Population per Platform).
6. Part Failure Rate
The part failure rate (number oftimes a part fails per year) is the predicted failure
rate of the part in a particular weapons system. It is assumed to be the average over all
weapon systems using the part. The failure rate is a specific characteristic ofthe part.
The failure rate was also a variable that was assigned different values during different runs
of the model.
7. Part Demand
Part demand during a year is the predicted total annual failure rate of the part
during that year. It is the product of the part's failure rate and the total population of the
part. This is the demand for the part which must be met by the supply system.
Demand During a Year = (Failure Rate) x (Total Population During the Year).
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8. Inflation Factor
The inflation factor is used to adjust the price of the part in accordance with
inflation. In accordance with the guidance of the Office ofManagement and Budget
(OMB) Circular Number A-94 and the economic assumptions of the Budget of the United
States Government, Fiscal Year 1998, inflation for this model is assumed to be 2.7 percent
per year. The inflation factor is calculated by the following formula:
Inflation Factor = (1 +i) n ;
where: i = inflation rate, and
n = the number or years.
9. Unit Price
The price is the procurement price of the part (i.e., what the supply system pays
the manufacturer for the part). The price is adjusted for inflation beyond year zero. The
price is a specific characteristic of the part. The price is a variable in the model that can be
modified during different runs of the model.
10. DLA Surcharge
The DLA surcharge is the charge which the DLA Depot levies on top of the
procurement price of the part to recover the holding costs and other overhead costs
associated with the depot. The surcharge is calculated by multiplying the unit price by the
surcharge rate. The surcharge is a variable that can change each fiscal year. The purpose
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of the surcharge is to replenish the Navy Working Capital Fund (NAVICP) or Defense
Working Capital Fund (DLA Depot) corpus for the costs incurred in maintaining the spare
and repair parts inventory. The surcharge history for NAVICP was presented in
Chapter III.
DLA Surcharge = (Unit Price) x (Surcharge Rate).
11. Annual Costs from Inventory
The annual costs from inventory is the product of multiplying the annual demand
times the sum of the unit price plus the surcharge. This figure represents the cost ofthe
part from the current supply system in the absence of intelligent digital data.
Annual Costs From Inventory = (Part Demand) x [(Unit Price) + (DLA Surcharge)].
12. Annual Costs from Data
The annual costs from data represents the annual costs of obtaining parts using
intelligent digital data. The CIM/RAMP manufactured parts do not accrue holding costs.
Therefore, the annual costs from data is the product of the annual demand and the sum of
the unit price plus the portion of the DLA Surcharge not attributable to holding costs.
Recall from previous analysis (Ahern, 1991), that holding costs represent approximately
33 percent of the DLA surcharge. Holding costs are assumed to be eliminated when parts
are designated for CIM/RAMP manufacturing versus being maintained in inventory.
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Therefore, the cost of a part from data (i.e., designated for CIM/RAMP manufacturing)
then becomes the unit price of the part plus the remaining portion of the DLA surcharge
(l-.33=67 or 67 percent) that accounts for the cost of doing supply management business
other than holding costs. This is assumed to be a valid cost for RAMP as well as DLA.
Annual Costs From Data = (Part Demand) x {[(Unit Price) + [(. 67) x (Surcharge)]}.
13. Annual Difference in Costs
The annual difference in costs is the difference between the annual costs from
inventory and the annual costs from data.
Annual Difference in Costs = (Annual Costs From Inventory)
- (Annual Costs From Data).
14. Net Present Value
The net present value term represents the net present value of the total annual
differences in costs over the life cycle of the New Attack Submarine class. This term is an
estimate of the value of the intelligent digital data for the part under the stated conditions.
B. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF MODEL DEVELOPMENT
The model was constructed to from the theoretical framework of separately
determining the annual costs of the two alternative parts source methods. From these
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annual costs an annual differences are determined and a net present value of the annual
differences is calculated. The assumption made concerning the calculation of the holding
costs could have allowed the model as presented to be simplified. Because the two cost
alternatives are calculated using the same variable it is not necessary to calculate the costs
of each alternative part source. The model could easily have been simplified to a
calculation of the annual holding costs and a net present value ofthose annual holding
costs. The model was presented in the longer form to allow for follow-on investigation
using different methods for calculating the annual costs from inventory and from data,
where the variables for each cost calculation may not be the same. The model is was not
simplified because it was thought to be worthwhile to view it in its conceptual form.
C. VALUES ASSUMED FOR VARIABLES IN THE MODEL
1. Part Specific Characteristics
a. Population per Platform
The population per platform is used in the basic functioning ofthe model to
calculate the total population of the part within the New Attack Submarine class. Five
values were assigned to this variable during the analysis, one, two, five, 20, and 40. The
values selected are an upper and lower bound as well as three representative intermediate
point estimates. The point estimates represent a low population value, three median
population values, (i.e., the part appears several times within the same system in the
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submarine, or once in several different systems in the submarine), and a large population
value (i.e., part appears several times within several different systems in the submarine).
(Interview-B, 1997; Interview-AC, 1997; NAVSEA, 1993)
b. Failure Rate
The values chosen for failure rate (failures per year) ranged from 4.00 to
.033. These bounds represent four failures per year (one per quarter) and one failure in 30
years. The upper bound of four failures per year was considered to be the worst
acceptable predicted failure rate (Interview-AH, 1997). The lowest predicted failure rate
for a part is zero. However, in order to quantify a lower bound, one failure in 30 years or
0.033 failures per year was chosen. Thirty years is the expected life cycle of each New
Attack Submarine (PEO SUB-X). Additionally, three intermediate point estimates were
selected. These were one failure per year, (1.0), one failure in five years (0.2), and one
failure in ten years (0. 1). These values were chosen to provide other representative values
for failure rates throughout the range discussed.
c. Unit Price
The unit price is simply the procurement price of the part before any
surcharge is added. It is the price that the contractor was paid for the part. For the
purposes of this model, five unit price values were used. These values represent the upper
and lower bounds as well as three representative intermediate values. The upper bound
was estimated to be $90,000.00. The lower bound was considered to be $1 .00. The three
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intermediate estimates were selected as $10.00, $1000.00, and $10,000.00. Based on the
author's experience and discussions (Interview-AH, 1997), these values were thought to
conservatively represent low cost, medium cost and high cost parts.
2. DLA Surcharge Rate
The DLA surcharge rate is the "tax" that DLA levies on each part issued to pay for
managing the inventory of the part. It is a simple percentage of the unit price of the part.
The DLA surcharge rate varies from fiscal year to fiscal year. The historical DLA
surcharge rate for consumable items was unavailable (See Appendix B). The NAVICP
surcharge rate history from Table 3.1 was used in predicting the DLA surcharge rate
beyond FY-98. The predicted DLA surcharge rate was calculated by taking the average
of the NAVICP consumable item surcharge rates for the period FY-91 through FY-98.
This range of historical data was used because the shift was made to the working capital
fund system (revolving fund) in FY-91 . Prior to FY-91 the surcharge rates were lower
because not all the costs of doing business in the supply management business area were
being included in the surcharge. Previously, these "other" costs of doing business were
covered by appropriated funds. The average of the values for the period FY-91 through
FY-98 was used because the values resembled a uniform distribution across the range.





The inflation rate is the proportionate rate of change in the general price level per
year, as opposed to the proportionate increase in a specific price. It is usually measured
by a broad-based price index, such as the implicit deflator for Gross Domestic Product or
the Consumer Price Index. (OMB, 1992) This variable can be changed when necessary.
As mentioned earlier, an inflation rate of 2.7 percent is assumed for the life cycle ofthe
New Attack Submarine per the guidance contained in OMB Circular No. A-94 dated 29
October 1992, and the economic assumptions contained in the Budget ofthe United States
Government, Fiscal Year 1998 (OMB, 1992; OMB, 1997).
4. Discount Rate
The discount rate is the interest rate used in calculating the present value of
the annual difference in costs. In accordance with the guidance ofOMB Circular No. A-
94, a discount rate of 6.3 percent was used in this model.
D. OTHER MODEL ASSUMPTIONS
1
.
The design of the model assumes that the price paid to the manufacturer of
the part is the same whether the part is procured using intelligent digital data or whether it
is issued from stock.
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2. Thirty-three percent of the DLA surcharge is assumed to be a proxy for the
holding costs associated with maintaining the part in inventory. The difference between
the "cost from inventory" and the "cost from data" described above equates to the net
present value of this holding cost. This is a conservative estimate of the annual
savings/loss from using intelligent digital data. It also can be considered to be the value of
the intelligent digital data for that part.
E. MODEL RESULTS
The model was used to conduct the analysis for the different values described in
the previous section for the three part-specific variables while maintaining all other
assumptions and treating all other variables as constants. The three variables, unit price,
failure rate and population per platform, were each changed one at a time. Each variable
was assigned five different values; a lower bound, representative low, medium and high
intermediate values and an upper bound.
An output of the model is presented at the end of this appendix as Table C.6. The
numbers shown in the table are from the analysis conducted using the high unit price
($10,000.00), high failure rate (one failure per year), and high population per platform
(20) estimates. The values ofthe variable inputs are presented at the end of the output.
The model results using three variables with five values each resulted in 125 net
present value figures. The 125 values presented in the five tables represent the various
combinations of part specific variables. The net present value figures ranged from $1 for
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the lower bound combination to $503 million for the upper bound combination. The





1 2 5 20 40
4 $12,583,957 $25,167,914 $62,919,786 $251,679,145 $503,358,291
1.0 $3,145,989 $6,291,978 $15,729,946 $62,919,786 $125,839,572
0.2 $629,197 $1,258,396 $3,145,989 $12,583,957 $25,167,914
0.1 $314,598 $629,197 $1,572,994 $6,291,978 $12,583,957
0.033 $103,817 $207,635 $519,088 $2,076,352 $4,152,705
'Average Value $45,634,965






1 2 5 20 40
4 $1,398,217 $2,796,434 $6,991,087 $27,964,349 $55,928,698
1.0 $349,554 $699,108 $1,747,771 $6,991,087 $13,982,174
0.2 $69,910 $139,821 $349,554 $1,398,217 $2,796,434
0.1 $34,955 $69,910 $174,777 $699,108 $1,398,217
0.033 $11,535 $23,070 $57,676 $230,705 $461,411
Average Value $5,070,551




1 2 5 20 40
4 $139,821 $279,643 $699,108 $2,796,434 $5,592,869
1.0 $34,955 $69,910 $174,777 $699,108 $1,398,217
0.2 $6,991 $13,982 $34,955 $139,821 $279,643
0.1 $3,495 $6,991 $17,477 $69,910 $139,821
0.033 $1,153 $2,307 $5,767 $23,070 $46,141
Average Value $507,054





1 2 5 20 40
4 $1,398 $2,796 $6,991 $27,964 $55,928
1.0 $349 $699 $1,747 $6,991 $13,982
0.2 $70 $139 $349 $1,398 $2,796
0.1 $35 $70 $174 $699 $1,398
0.033 $11 $23 $57 $230 $461
Average Value $5,070




1 2 5 20 40
4 $139 $279 $699 $2,796 $5,592
1.0 $35 $70 $174 $699 $1,398
0.2 $7 $14 $35 $139 $279
0.1 $3 $7 $17 $70 $139
0.033 $1 $2 $6 $23 $46
Average Value $507
Table C.5. Model Results - Unit Price = $1.00
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APPENDIX D. REVERSE ENGINEERING COST ESTIMATION
Another approach to estimating the value of intelligent digital data is to ask the
question "What would it cost to do it ourselves?". The cost of producing the intelligent
digital data equates to the cost of reverse engineering the parts using RAMP technology.
Simply, the Navy should not pay any more for the intelligent digital data for a part than it
would cost the Navy to generate that data from a reverse engineering process.
The costs of reverse engineering using RAMP technology vary according to
whether the part is a small mechanical part (SMP) or a printed wire assembly (PWA), the
amount of technical documentation available, and the complexity of the part. For PWAs
the complexity involves the number of layers and discrete components associated with the
PWA. For SMPs the complexity involves the number of features, (i.e., surfaces, finishes,
and penetrations). To estimate the cost of reverse engineering, a complexity rating would
need to be identified along with an available documentation factor. A documentation
factor addresses the amount of documentation available to describe the part. These two
factors could be combined to generate a time estimate to accomplish the reverse
engineering. This time estimate could then be multiplied times the cost per hour of the
reverse engineering process to obtain an estimated cost for the reverse engineering
process.
A proposed cost estimate model is provided below using hypothetical numbers,
due to the lack of actual numbers and relationships.
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A. COMPLEXITY RATING
The basis for the complexity rating varies between PWAs and SMPs. For PWAs
complexity depends on the number of layers and discrete components attached to the
PWA. For SMPs complexity depends on the number of features. A hypothetical
complexity rating matrix is provided as Table D.l (Interview-N, 1997; Interview-T, 1997:
Interview-AI, 1997)) 5 . The matrix is entered with the number the complexity factor
characteristics of the part (i.e., For an SMP, the number of features). For a PWA, the
number of layers and discrete components.) The matrix will then provide a complexity
rating with which to enter Table D.3 or D.4.
Complexity Rating
1 2 3
SMP PWA SMP PWA SMP PWA
Features 0-10 ~ 10-20 ~ 20-50 —
Layers ~ 0-2 ~ 2-4 ~ 4-8
Discrete Components — 0-50 -- 50-150 ~ 150-250
Table D.l. Complexity Factors.
The numbers used in this matrix and subsequent matrices in this appendix are
hypothetical. They are based on discussions and a single average point estimate.
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B. DOCUMENTATION FACTOR
The basis for the documentation factor is simply how much supporting
documentation is available to assist in the reverse engineering process. Documentation is
any information that describes the function or composition of the part. It can take the
form of design drawings, technical manuals, or maintenance procedures. A hypothetical
documentation factor table is provided as Table D.2.
Documentation Factors
1 Sample data providing physical description.
2 Some data, providing physical and functional description including
tolerances, finishes, interfaces, design intent, and environmental intent.
3 Available data provides physical, functional, and manufacturing process
description. Also provides test process information.
Table D. 2. Documentation Factors (Interview-AI, 1997)
C. REVERSE ENGINEERING TIME ESTIMATION
The time estimation process for reverse engineering takes the form of determining
a value from a matrix based on both the complexity and documentation factors developed
from Tables D. 1 and D.2 above. Hypothetical time estimation matrices are provided as
Table D.3 and D.4. These tables are loosely based on interview data (Interview-T, 1997;
Interview-H, 1997, Interview-AI, 1997). Table D.3 is for estimating time for SMPs.
Table D.4 is for estimating time for PWAs.
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Reverse Engineering Time Estimation Table (Hours) - SMP
Documentation Factor
Complexity Rating 1 2 3
1 4 3 2
2 6 5 4
3 12 10 8
Table D.3. Reverse Engineering Time Estimation Table - SMP
Reverse Engineering Time Estimation Table (Hours) - PWA
Documentation Factor
Complexity Factor 1 2 3
1 90 82 66
2 120 90 84
3 140 115 105
Table D.4. Reverse Engineering Time Estimation Table - PWA
D. REVERSE ENGINEERING COST CALCULATION
The reverse engineering cost calculation is simply the product of multiplying the
time estimate in hours by the cost per hour. Using the time estimates from the time
estimation matrices (Tables D.3 and D.4) and assuming the cost per hour to be $75.00 per
hour, examples of cost calculations for both a PWA and an SMP are provided in
Table D.5.
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2 1 120 $75.00 $9,000.00
SMP
(Example)
3 2 10 $75.00 $750.00
Table D.5. Reverse Engineering Cost Calculation Example
E. SUMMARY
This method of cost estimation could be very useful not only in estimating the cost
of intelligent data for the purposes of procuring the data, but also for the purposes of
evaluating whether it would be cost effective to reverse engineer an existing part for the
purposes of exploring alternative sources of procurement. The example numbers provided
in the explanation of this method were for the most part hypothetical. However, at least
one number used was realistic, and was obtained during interviews with various RAMP
facility managers. The cost per hour to reverse engineer is approximately $75.00. It is
generally more time consuming to reverse engineer a PWA than it is a SMP. Other than
that, no conclusions should be drawn based on the numbers in these examples.
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